How Turkey Changed in 5 Years | Türkiye’s Foreign Relations 2015 – 2020

Preface

This series of studies review the remarkable developments in Türkiye’s international, regional, and internal status over the last five years (2015-2020) that witnessed qualitative and fundamental changes, including the failed coup in 2016, the restructuring of the Turkish State, the referendum, and transforming the government into the Presidential System. 

There were also many international and regional changes— most notably, Donald Trump becoming the United States President and the changes in the States Administration’s priorities after Joe Biden took over. It is equally important to mention the effective direction of Türkiye’s foreign policy towards international issues such as Syria and Libya and its increasing role in Africa and Central Asia.

Finally, the economic, social, and political changes imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Our studies cover Türkiye’s energy, military industrialization, foreign relations, internal status, economy, external military interventions, and military bases beyond national borders.

As Türkiye faces many challenges while moving forward, we hope to shed light on the facts of Türkiye’s current regional and international position compared to five years ago.

Dr. Mustafa Al-Wahaib
Director of Anadolu Center for Near East Studies 

1. Introduction

Türkiye’s foreign policy has undergone significant changes since 2015 due to the various developments in the country’s political and diplomatic positions.

Domestically, the Turkish foreign policy course was severely affected by the failed coup in 2016 and the transition to the presidential system in 2017.

Internationally, Türkiye has been involved in many issues related to the unstable region, like the conflict over energy resources, the delimitation of maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean, and military intervention abroad.

It is also important to mention Türkiye’s stance towards the Arab Spring and its support for Qatar during the Gulf Crisis, which critically affected its relations with some Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia.

In this study, we comprehensively analyze Türkiye’s foreign relations with regional and international powers since 2015.

Although there are some countries that have a constant relationship with Türkiye, we found it important to cite them in the appendix of our study.

2. Key Drivers of the Turkish Foreign Policy

Identifying the so-called “inputs and outputs” as a tool of analysis, in addition to the traditions and experiences that form the constants of the country’s foreign policy, is essential in studying external relations. Furthermore, we apply the principle of variables to analyze the changes in the foreign policy of Türkiye.  

In this context, Türkiye’s foreign policy is shaped by a variety of factors:

1- The political ideology of its governing elite (i.e., Kemalism).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s ideological framework laid out the path that Türkiye’s foreign policy would follow, regardless of the different orientations of the successive Turkish governments. 

The Kemalism principles include the following:

– Secularism: 

In order to maintain a modern and more comprehensive society, secularism was considered a necessary component. It covered the political and governmental, as well as the cultural life.[1] Thus, according to Atatürk’s principle, the state may not build or adopt internal or external policies on a religious basis as in the past.

– Nationalism

As defined by Atatürk, geographical, political, cultural, and historical unity is the framework of Nationalism. There are also influential factors that established the Turkish Nation, including the unity in political existence, language, origin, ancestry, and common history.[2]

– Republicanism 

Republicanism was the main principle of Atatürk’s revolution. It became the basis of the new Turkish state and has been preserved in its constitutions since 1924. Atatürk said that “the form of government which provides the most modern and logical application of the principle of democracy is the republic, which is the most appropriate administration to the nature and customs of the Turkish nation.”[3]

2- The History Factor:

Turkish foreign policy is based on the Ottoman Empire’s cultural and historical context. Its legacy contributed to the revival of Türkiye’s regional role, especially with Islamic and Arab countries. The consequences of this legacy are fundamentally reflected in Türkiye’s foreign policy, as well.[4]

3- The Geopolitical and Geostrategic Location

Türkiye’s privileged geographic location— a land bridge linking Europe and Asia— is a key driver in its foreign policy. However, it makes it more vulnerable to international developments and imbalances, and as put by former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, it created the “national security syndrome.” 

In this context, Türkiye’s foreign policy and security were affected by the repercussions of the conflict in its immediate regional neighborhood. This included the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the continued development of Eastern Europe; the crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the Balkans; the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, and Abkhazia in the Caucasus; and the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq after the 1990-1991 Gulf War. 

As a part of the Middle East, Türkiye has experienced general insecurity caused by the instability in the region, such as the Arab-Israeli wars, the first and second Gulf wars, and the state of the security vacuum and conflicts after the Arab Spring revolutions.[5]

2.1 Constants of Turkish foreign policy

The constants in foreign policy define the state’s fixed orientations toward regional and global issues.

The constants in Turkish foreign policy can be sorted as follows: 

• NATO Membership: maintaining its membership in the largest military alliance in the world.
• Affiliation to Europe: Türkiye is a founding member of almost all European institutions, including the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
• The Strategic Partnership with the United States: the compass of Turkish foreign policy has been consistent with the direction of the United States since the founding of the modern Turkish Republic.
• Expansion into Central Asia and the Caucasus: due to the linguistic and ethnic ties, Türkiye has a constant foreign policy toward the Turkish republics (Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. 
• Black Sea security: relations with Russia and the safety of the Black Sea form a strategic focus in Türkiye’s foreign policy.[6]

2.2 Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy

In terms of foreign policy, change is a political phenomenon that includes a wide range of relative adoptions that can be simple but frequent and do not affect the country’s main course of foreign policy. The change, however, can be radical, not frequent, and requires restructuring of foreign policy and persuading the bureaucratic government agencies and society (if the system is democratic) to bring about this change.[7]

“According to the regional and international political variables, the Middle East and the Balkans are the most critical files that witnessed Türkiye’s foreign policy change.”

2.2.1 The Middle East

Türkiye-Arab relations were characterized by political stagnation in the 1950s, but they changed relatively along with the fall of the Soviet Union. Notably, a rapprochement with Arab and regional countries emerged with the AK Party’s arrival to power.[8]

2.2.2 Russia and the Balkans

Enmity has always prevailed in Turkish-Russian relations. During the Cold War, the confrontation increased after Türkiye sided with the Western camp and joined NATO to face the Soviet expansion in the Middle East and Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Russia and Türkiye started to take a significant role in their foreign policy.[9] This change was evident through the implementation of gas pipeline projects to export Russian gas to Türkiye.[10] During the AK Party’s rule, the value of trade exchange between the two countries increased.[11]

During the Cold War, the Turkish foreign policy paid particular attention to the Balkans region as it was considered a forward base for the Western bloc. Although this strategic importance was subjected to fluctuations caused by political influences, Türkiye benefited greatly, and the Balkans became a priority for Türkiye during the war in Bosnia—that priority declined after the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the Bosnian war, and the restoration of stability in the region.[12]

2.3 Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies

Türkiye’s foreign policy is based on three main strategies: 

2.3.1 Peace at Home, Peace in the World

Since the state’s founding, Türkiye’s international engagement has been influenced by the Peace at Home, Peace in the World strategy, formulated by the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[13]

The strategy is based on resorting to peace in foreign relations by adhering to international law. Accordingly, Türkiye followed that tactic to maintain its independence during the major powers’ wars in Europe, a disengagement that enabled Türkiye to avoid the mandate in the event of its defeat.[14]

2.3.2 Zero Problems with Neighbors

Articulated by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto?lu, the Zero Problems strategy aims to establish friendly relations with the region’s countries based on the following principles:

• The balance between security and freedom: that the freedom of expression and democracy should be protected in a way that is not detrimental to the state
• Zero problems with neighbors: like ending the problems of Syria and Cyprus, and normalizing relations with Armenia
• Multidimensional foreign policy: not relying on one international party, i.e., the Western camp, and openness to the East as well, in a way that achieves balance and guarantees Turkish interests
• Active regional policy: strengthening ties with regional countries and activating the Turkish role in the region
• New diplomatic style: abandoning the long-standing differences that dominate the foreign policy agenda and drain its energy in international relations

Work on this strategy started after the Justice and Development Party’s rise to power in 2002, and it has been implemented in various initiatives, such as addressing the Cyprus problem, curbing military actions in Syria, normalizing relations with Armenia, and strengthening bonds with developing international regions such as Asia, Latin America, and Africa.[15]

“Türkiye maintained a soft power diplomacy strategy that is focused on avoiding interference in other countries until 2015.”

2.3.3 Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan)

The concept of the Blue Homeland Doctrine emerged from a plan drawn up by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz in 2006. It was later crystallized by retired Admiral Prof. Dr. Cihat Yayc?, Head of Naval and Strategic Research at Bahçe?ehir University.

Representing Türkiye’s Hard Power, Mavi Vatan emphasizes Türkiye’s expansion and influence in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and the Black Sea through a combination of military and diplomatic means that would enable Türkiye to access energy and other economic resources.

In 2015, President Erdo?an adopted the Blue Homeland Doctrine as part of a national strategy of “forward defense” in the context of his ongoing endeavors to assert Türkiye’s independence in all aspects of foreign policy to include influence in the surrounding regions.[16]

Under this doctrine, Türkiye seems more willing to use military force to implement its vision, objectives, and policy. This has been evidenced by the deployment of Turkish military frigates to secure oil exploration in the eastern Mediterranean, the military intervention in Libya, and the support for allies like Qatar and Azerbaijan with military forces.

Check how the Turkish military industry changed in five years in a previous study by AYAM. [17]

3. Turkish-Russian Relations

Türkiye and Russia have had a turbulent relationship due to their history of conflict. For the most part, the Russian Empire’s ambition to take over parts of the Ottoman Empire, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles strait, led to the Twelve Wars that extended for centuries, summarized in Table No. (1).

War Number	Date	Result
1	1568–1570	Russian military victory
2	1676–1681	–
3	1686-1700	Russia was able to occupy parts of Ottoman territory
4	1710-1711	The victory of the Ottomans and the restoration of occupied territory
5	1735-1739	The Ottomans controlled many areas in Serbia and Belgrade under the Treaty of Belgrade.
6	1768-1774	Russian victory, and control of lands in Crimea
7	1787 – 1792	Russian victory, Ottoman recognition of Crimea to Russia
8	1812	Russia annexed the city of Bessarabia
9	1828-1829	Occupation of the Danubian Principalities by Russia, independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire
10	1853-1856	The victory of the Ottomans, the British, and the French.Russia ceded Moldova and de jure recognized Ottoman sovereignty over the Danubian Principalities
11	1877-1878	The victory of Russia and its allies, the de jure independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, and the de facto independence of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire
12	World War I 1916	The victory of the Ottomans and  Germany over Russia, and the signing of the treaty of Kars, which returned the lands that were once occupied by Russia.

The conflict between the interests of the two countries remained between 2015 and 2020. These conflicts were mainly due to Russia’s military expansion in various regions, including Syria, Armenia, the separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Libya. Justifiably, Türkiye was worried about a military encirclement by Russia.

A golden age followed with the AK Party taking power in Türkiye, and economic ties solidified the relations between the two countries. Indeed, Russia is Türkiye’s top trading partner. In 2019, the two countries’ total trade volume amounted to 26 billion US dollars. The value of Turkish exports was 3.854 billion US dollars, while imports reached 22.454 billion US dollars. In addition, Energy projects such as the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the TurkStream gas pipeline, and the Blue Streamline form the solid basis for the relations between the two countries. Likewise, the cooperation between Türkiye and Russia in tourism is essential for their bilateral relations. In 2019, over 7 million Russian tourists visited Türkiye.[18]

3.1 The Black Sea Security

The fact that the security of the Black Sea ranks among the constants in Turkish foreign policy sparked several wars with Russia, which sought to reach the warm waters for a long time. Being unable to control the straits, Russia had to sign treaties with Türkiye and other countries to regulate the passage of ships of all shapes and sizes in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits.

Montreux Convention:

The treaty was signed by Türkiye, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, and former Yugoslavia in 1936 in Switzerland. It was the last treaty to regulate the transit of ships through the Straits.

Terms of Treaty: 

• Authorizing the full Turkish control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles strait
• Regulating the passage of military vessels
• Ensuring complete freedom of navigation and passage for merchants vessels, under any flag with any cargo, in the straits in peacetime
• Allowing Türkiye to rearm its military on the side or near the straits
• Confirmation of Türkiye’s right to close the strait to foreign warships in times of war or when it is under threat of aggression
• Granting Türkiye the right to refuse the transit of commercial ships on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.
•  Non-Black-Sea states willing to send a vessel must notify Türkiye 8 days prior of their sought passing
• No more than nine foreign warships, with a total aggregate tonnage of 15,000 tons, may pass at any one time.
• Black Sea states may transit ships of any tonnage, escorted by no more than two destroyers.[19]

“Russia, the former Soviet Union’s heir, is the biggest recipient of the treaty as it owns the most naval and commercial ships and submarines.”

In a related context, The Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 allowed it to expand its naval capacity and space and shift the strategic balance in its favor, which Türkiye utterly opposed for many reasons:

1. Following the occupation of Crimea, Russia’s coastline expanded from 475 km to 1,200 km (about 25%of the total seafront). This is roughly the length of Türkiye’s shores on the Black Sea, which is 1,785 km ( about 35% of the total coastline).
2. With its military presence in Crimea, Russia has become geographically closer to the Turkish coast.[20]
3. The annexation also raised Türkiye’s concerns about the Crimean Tatars, who hold historically close ties to Türkiye.[21]

In its turn, Türkiye has responded by building up its military forces and encouraging NATO to deploy into the Black Sea, resulting in strategic consequences for both countries.

3.2 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Russia and Türkiye are profoundly engaged in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. While Moscow has a defense agreement with Armenia[212], Türkiye has a strategic partnership and a mutual support agreement with Azerbaijan and considers their relations as one of the Turkish foreign policy constants.[23]

In April 2016, Nagorno–Karabakh witnessed the worst escalation of violence since the ceasefire was signed in 1994. The Azerbaijani army made minor gains on the ground, but the operations led to heavy losses for both countries. In conjunction, tensions between Türkiye and Russia intensified following Türkiye’s downing of a Russian jet, which triggered a harsh exchange of words between the two countries.[24]

Russia has historically supported Armenia in its disputes with Azerbaijan. However, with the advent of an anti-Russian Armenian government after the revolution of 2018, Russia did not provide enough support to Armenia in the last war with Azerbaijan in late 2020. In contrast, Türkiye helped the Azerbaijan government with military consultations, weapons, and political support, which was enough for the Azerbaijani government to restore several occupied territories.[25]

3.3 Syrian War

Due to its geographic proximity and the growing threat posed by its internal instability, Syria has received a large share of Türkiye’s foreign policy priority. The Turkish-Russian intervention in Syria has greatly impacted their relationship. It started in 2012 as Türkiye supported the opposition to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria, while Russia deployed its forces there in 2015 to support the Syrian regime militarily. The Russian Air Force played a vital role in helping the Syrian regime’s forces, which were able to retake a large portion of the country from the opposition[26]. As a result, the relationship between Türkiye and Russia became strained due to the conflicting interests in the Syrian File and the downing of the Russian fighter by Türkiye in 2015.

In the same year, the two countries managed to overcome their crisis and improve their relations. They also coordinated their efforts in addressing the Syrian issue by offering political agreements such as the Astana and Sochi.[27]

3.4 Economic Relations

Due to Russia’s economic sanctions against Türkiye after the aircraft downing, the two countries’ trade rate decreased by a third, from $23.9 billion in 2015 to $16.8 billion in 2016. The tourism sector experienced the most significant recession, followed by the real estate sector, with a loss of up to ten billion dollars, more than 1% of Türkiye’s GDP. Meanwhile, exports of Russian gas, which account for the bulk of total trade between the two States, continued without restrictions.[28]

In late 2016, Russia lifted most of the economic sanctions imposed on Türkiye, and trade between the two countries increased by 37% in the first half of 2018 to reach $13.3 billion. Turkish exports to Russia rose by 47%, while imports from Russia increased by 36 percent. Furthermore, the Turkish Stream project was reactivated, and the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant was built to generate electricity.[29]

Thereupon, Türkiye and Russia established a joint fund to improve their economic relations. Its objective was to promote trade exchange between the two countries through their local currencies instead of the dollar.

On December 29, 2017, Türkiye strengthened its military defense cooperation with Russia by signing a contract with the Russian state-owned arms company, Almaz Central Design Bureau, to supply two batteries of S-400 missiles[30], which was rejected by the European Union and the United States.[31]

All things considered, Russia ranks as Türkiye’s second-largest economic partner after Germany in infrastructure, transport, energy, agriculture, and tourism.

4. Turkish-US Relations

Over the years, Türkiye has viewed its relations with the U.S. as strategic one. However, the two countries have experienced a significant rift during the past decade due to various disagreements, which kept them, even formally, from the path of their traditional relationship as members of NATO. 

The Most Prominent Cases of the Dispute: 

4.1 The American Pastor Detention

Andrew Brunson is an American pastor who lived in Türkiye for nearly twenty years and worked in the Izmir Resurrection Church. In October 2016, He was arrested by the Turkish authorities on charges of espionage and having links with the Gülen movement and PKK. In return, the U.S. Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on two ministers in the Turkish government.[32]

In August 2018, following several failed diplomatic efforts to release the pastor, former US President Donald Trump announced a new trade policy regarding the refusal of Turkish aluminum and steel imports. Still, the Turkish government rejected Trump’s arbitrary decision as it contravened the World Trade Organization rules.[33]

Signs of growing distrust between Türkiye and the U.S. reached their climax after the arrest of American and Turkish nationals working in the American consulate, for their links with the Gülen movement, according to the Turkish authorities.[34]

In October 2018, Andrew Brunson was released and returned to the United States. As a result, sanctions against Türkiye were partially lifted[35], but they caused a deterioration of relations between the two countries.

4.2 Gülen’s Extradition Demands 

Fethullah Gülen, who has lived in the U.S. since 1999, is considered the mastermind of the 2016 coup attempt. Hence, the Turkish government repeatedly demanded his extradition, but the U.S. government denied it, which exacerbated the tensions between the two.[36]

4.3 S-400 System Crisis

The U.S. rejected the Turkish demands to purchase the American “Patriot” air defense missile systems, which prompted Türkiye to turn to Russia to obtain S-400 air defense missile systems instead.

The U.S. opposed Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 missile system, claiming it would not be interoperable with NATO’s defense system, in addition to insecurity concerns that the next generation of F-35 fighter jets could be compromised by the S-400 system.[37] 

Following Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 missile system, the U.S. decided to terminate its participation in the F-35 program and threatened to impose economic sanctions against it[38]. At the same time, Türkiye responded that the missile system was necessary to protect its airspace.

4.4 YPG Support

Türkiye has continuously expressed its anger and condemnation of Washington’s support for the PKK terrorist organization’s Syrian wing (YPG) to fight ISIS. 

Moreover, Türkiye says the United States has disregarded its national security concerns in its partnership with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.[39]

The two countries’ relations became worse after the Turkish Forces’ operations were carried out against the “SDF” units in northwestern Syria in the city of Afrin in 2018 and northeastern Syria in the cities of Jarablus and Ras al-Ain in 2019.[40]

4.5 The American Perspective of the Turkish-Russian Confrontations

Both Türkiye and Russia are on the opposite sides of several military conflicts in different regions, such as Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In this respect, there are various interpretations of the U.S. political vision regarding the Türkiye-Russia confrontation.

– Some believe that Türkiye is a NATO ally, and it can be considered a counterbalance to Russia’s presence in the Middle East. More optimistically, the joint opposition to Russia can also be a basis for reviving the faltering US-Turkish relations.

The statements of former US Ambassador, the United States Special Representative for Syria Engagement, and the Special Envoy to the International military intervention against ISIL James Jeffrey came to confirm this vision. 

Jeffrey praised the Turkish role in Idlib and noted that Türkiye’s military mission in Syria could receive financial support from the US or NATO.[41]

– Another opinion states that Türkiye is out of control and is heading towards partnership with Russia in many fields. This idea argues that the growing number of Russian-Turkish bilateral agreements has strengthened the Russian-Turkish relations and is threatening the Western orientation of Türkiye.[42]

5. Türkiye-EU Relations

Türkiye’s relationship with the European Union is one of membership and mutual benefit, and the two sides share many issues related to their national security. Despite the recent dispute between the two parties, the relationship with the EU remains a constant in Türkiye’s foreign policy. Similarly, the EU states still find an important partner in Türkiye in many cases. This was confirmed by President Emmanuel Macron’s statement to the Kathimerini newspaper in September 2017:

“Türkiye had already moved away from the European Union, but I want to avoid the split. Türkiye is a vital partner in addressing the various crises we all face, especially the immigration challenge and the terrorist threat.”

Here, we highlight four major cases that played a role in shaping EU-Türkiye relations between 2015-2020:

5.1 Eastern Mediterranean and Energy Security

In December 2019, the European Council rejected the agreement between Türkiye and Libya regarding the delimitation of the water border between the two countries. The Council noted that this agreement violated the rights of the third parties and affirmed its solidarity with Cyprus and Greece against those actions by Türkiye.

In the same year, Türkiye escalated its security measures, escorting its drilling ships with military vessels in the eastern Mediterranean, a move that sparked strong opposition from the European Union and the threat of severe economic sanctions against Türkiye.[44]

At the request of Cyprus, on July 13, 2020, the foreign ministers of the European Union agreed to prepare additional listings within the framework of the existing sanctions on Türkiye’s drilling operations in the eastern Mediterranean. On July 23, French President Emmanuel Macron demanded EU sanctions against Türkiye’s policy in Greek and Cypriot waters. “I stand fully behind Cyprus and Greece in the face of the Turkish violations of their sovereignty,” said Macron.[45]

Accordingly, France has signed an agreement with Southern Cyprus to service French warships at Marie, the Cypriot naval base.[46] The French President ordered French forces in the eastern Mediterranean to provide military assistance to Greece. France, for the first time, deployed Rafale fighters to help carry out military patrols in the Cypriot exclusive economic zone under a military cooperation agreement.[47]

Meanwhile, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has appealed for de-escalation of tension in the eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Türkiye, warning that it could lead to a disaster. “The two countries are still open to dialogue despite their disagreements,” said Germany’s Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas.[48]

Finally, the European Union’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was placed firmly against Turkish interests and rights in its exclusive economic waters due to the convergence of French and Italian (and somewhat German) policies in support of Greece and Greek Cyprus.[49]

5.2 Refugees 

Türkiye has witnessed an unprecedented influx of refugees from Syria and other countries— more than 3.7 million as of the date of writing this study.[50] The fact that Türkiye has formed a bridge for many refugees to cross into the European Union pushed the latter to draw up a joint action plan, which was activated at the EU-Türkiye Summit on November 29, 2015. The plan aimed at preventing irregular migration flows to the EU.

In their joint statement of 18 March 2016, the EU and Türkiye have committed to ending irregular migration from Türkiye to Europe, breaking smugglers’ business model, and offering migrants an alternative to risking their lives by heading to Europe.[51]

The future of refugees, mainly Syrians, has been the subject of a constant dialogue between the European Union and Türkiye for more than four years, during which the European Union agreed to pay 6 billion euros to the Turkish government to support Syrian refugees. 

However, Türkiye is constantly calling for greater support for embracing refugees in terms of integration, financial, and educational support. Admittedly, some European political parties have expressed that Türkiye should not bear the burden alone, and the financial measures included in the Refugee Support Fund should be expanded.

5.3 Economic Relations

Türkiye and the European Union have a set of mutually beneficial economic interests. There is also a customs union that allows free movement of goods between the parties.

The European Union is Türkiye’s first trading partner and source of investments, while Türkiye ranks as the fifth largest trading partner of the European Union. In numbers, the EU market constitutes 42.4% of the total Turkish exports, while Türkiye’s total imports from the EU reached 32.3%.[52]

Year	Türkiye’s imports from the European Union	Türkiye’s exports to the European Union
2016	72.4	55.7
2017	76.7	61.4
2018	69.2	68.8
2019	68.3	69.8

As shown in Table (2), Türkiye’s imports decreased by 1.3% in 2019 compared to the previous year, and the proportion of European imports from Türkiye amounted to 4.4% compared to 2018. This is due to the adoption and development of Turkish industries and the production of many goods that Türkiye previously imported.[53]

5.4 Counter-Terrorism

Despite the differences in the priorities of the two sides, counterterrorism cooperation between Türkiye and the European Union will remain a priority. The most critical security concern that has preoccupied both sides in the past five years is the issue of hundreds of ISIS jihadists and their families detained by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units. 

Some of the jihadists were arrested by the Turkish authorities on the Syrian-Turkish border, and it turned out that they held European passports. The rest, who are still in Syria, are likely to return to their countries in the European Union via Türkiye. This threat has imposed security cooperation between Türkiye and the European Union, which serves the interests of both parties, and prevents any terrorist acts.[54]

6. Turkish-Saudi Relations

The deteriorating relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia were highlighted by the events that occurred between 2015 and 2020. Some of these included the Qatar Crisis and the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul.

On March 13, 2015, the Turkish President expressed Türkiye’s readiness to support the Decisive Storm[55] alliance logistically in the military operation in Yemen against the Houthis.[56]

On April 14, 2016, the Turkish Foreign Minister and his Saudi counterpart signed an agreement to set up a “Strategic Coordination Council” to strengthen eight sectors, including agriculture, the army, culture, combating terrorism, in addition to diplomatic relations.[57]

Six months after the failed coup attempt in Türkiye in 2016, President Erdo?an toured the Gulf, starting with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.[58]

Then, in June 2017, there was a clear divergence between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia regarding the Qatar blockade.[59] Türkiye’s siding with Qatar and constructing a Turkish military base there provoked Saudi Arabia and negatively impacted the two countries’ relations.[60]

In 2020, things got worse with an “informal” Saudi boycott of Turkish goods. Many Saudi companies, encouraged by the government-linked Saudi Chamber of Commerce, rejected doing business with Türkiye.

On November 20, 2020, King Salman made a phone call with President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an to invite him to attend the G20 economic summit that was held in Saudi Arabia, and the two sides discussed how to improve the tense relations between the two countries.[61]

7. Turkish-Emirati Relations

The United Arab Emirates was previously ranked among Türkiye’s largest Arab trading partners and was a major source of foreign direct investment. According to statistics, Türkiye’s trade with the UAE decreased sharply after 2017—  by 66% in exports and 32% in imports in 2017.[62]

The Arab Spring revolutions indicate that Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates were at odds with one another. While the first supported the revolutions, the UAE was against them. Disagreements between the two parties intensified as Türkiye embraced figures affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which the UAE fought politically and in the media in several countries.

The contention expanded severely between the two countries during the Libyan Crisis. Türkiye stood by the internationally recognized Government of National Accord and supported it militarily and politically. In contrast, the UAE supported Khalifa Haftar’s forces militarily and financially. It is also to be mentioned that the Qatar Crisis and Türkiye’s stance exacerbated the situation. 

Moreover, the UAE also stood against Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean and organized military exercises with Greece.

Besides, Turkish media always indicate that the UAE played a role in the failed coup in 2016 and spent billions of dollars supporting the Kurdish People’s Protection Units in Syria.[63]

8. Turkish-Iranian Relations

Over the past years, Türkiye and Iran have managed to separate their economic relations from their regional rivalry, which has partially contributed to controlling the mutual policies between the two in order to protect their common economic interests.

To Türkiye, Iran is a strategic source of crude oil and natural gas supplies necessary for its energy security and diversification policy. Iran’s large population also makes it an important market for Türkiye’s exports.

Despite Iran’s criticism of Türkiye’s intervention in Iraq, it does not seem to have any objection when Türkiye carries out a military operation against Kurdish positions in the country.[64] Of course, Türkiye and Iran have a common concern about the independence of Kurdistan in northern Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state. [65]

The relationship between the two countries began to be tense with the beginning of the Syrian Revolution in 2015. Iran supported the Assad regime militarily and politically. On the other hand, Türkiye sided with the Syrian opposition. Considerably, each side sought to undermine and condemn the other party’s policy in Syria.[66]

Then, a rapprochement occurred between the two countries after Iran opposed the failed military coup attempt in Türkiye in 2016. Türkiye also criticized the protests in Iran in 2018 and opposed the US sanctions imposed on Iran in the same year.[67]

As a result, cooperation between the two parties increased despite their differences in the Syrian file. In 2017, the Turks met with the Iranians, along with the Russians, in the tripartite meeting in Sochi and then in Astana to sponsor the negotiations between the Syrian opposition and the regime.

9. Turkish-Egyptian Relations

Tensions between Türkiye and Egypt grew after the military coup carried out by current President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi against the elected government in 2013. Despite the tension between the two countries, their diplomatic relations were maintained at the level of Chargés d’affaires.[68]

The two countries enjoy strong economic ties as Egypt is Türkiye’s main trading partner in Africa. Surprisingly, the value of trade exchange between the two parties recorded an increase from 2015 to 2019, despite the political crisis.[69]

Year	Turkish exports to Egypt	Turkish imports from Egypt
2015	$2.2 billion	$863 million
2016	$2 billion	$706 million
2017	$1.8 billion	$909 million
2018	$1.9 billion	$1.1 billion
2019	$2.6 billion	$1 billion

Table No. (3): Turkish-Egyptian Exports and Imports between 2015 – 2019

Tensions increased between the two countries after Türkiye signed a maritime boundary treaty with Libya in 2019. In response, the Egyptian government rejected and signed a counter-treaty with Greece demarcating their water borders.

Tensions rose after Türkiye militarily intervened on the side of the Government of National Accord against Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by Egypt. Unquestionably, the Turkish military’s support turned the tide of the war in favor of the GNA. 

Signs of improved relations began in early 2021 after Türkiye issued instructions to TV channels run by the Egyptian opposition in Istanbul to mitigate its criticism of the Sisi regime. In early May 2021, a Turkish delegation visited Cairo, which gave fresh impetus to the relations between the two.[70]

The return of Turkish-Egyptian relations can be explained by the international transformations, especially in the Middle East. These transformations may result in the American withdrawal from the region, which could leave behind a security vacuum that may be interspersed with the spread of cross-border militias that threaten the countries’ safety. 

10. Turkish-Libyan Relations

The former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s visit to Libya in 1979 marked the beginning of the Turkish-Libyan relations. During the time of Muammar Gaddafi, the two countries signed a number of economic agreements in various fields. 

More trade agreements to enhance trade exchange were signed in 1987 when former Turkish Prime Minister Kenan Evren visited Libya. Relations between the two countries continued to develop, reaching the highest levels in the late 1990s. 

In 2010, The trade exchange amounted to 9.8 billion dollars, and Libya announced that it would grant Türkiye investments of $100 billion.[71]

Türkiye announced its official position supporting mobility and demands for political change i?n the revolution against Gaddafi. After the fall of that regime, the spread of internal chaos, and the militias, Türkiye sided with the legitimate and UN-recognized Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli, against the mutinous Major General Khalifa Haftar.

Based on the Blue Homeland doctrine, Türkiye and the Government of National Accord signed in 2019 the Treaty on the Demarcation of Water Boundaries (Exclusive Economic Zone) in the Eastern Mediterranean. (For more information, see our study on how Türkiye changed in five years, foreign military bases and interventions.)[72]

In 2019, Türkiye intervened militarily in Libya after Haftar’s forces, backed by several international parties, carried out military operations against the Government of National Accord to control Tripoli, the capital, and overthrow the government.

However, the contribution of the Turkish naval and ground forces, backed by drones, enabled the GNA to repel the attacks of Haftar’s forces and regain control of many cities and regions located on the western coastline, in addition to regaining control of many strategic military bases in Libya.[73]

After the formation of a National Unity Government in Libya in 2021, Türkiye maintained its political and economic interests and signed several trade agreements in different fields. 

11.  A comparison of the Course of Turkish Foreign Relations before and after 2015

	The course of Turkish foreign relations before 2015	The course of Turkish foreign relations after 2015
Turkish-Russian Relations	– Strained relationships	– Rapprochement to calm the relations- Coordination in several cases- An increase in the trade exchange index between the two countries
Turkish-US Relations	– High coordination between the two countries in all cases	– Disagreements regarding SDF,- Eastern Mediterranean Case- Russian S-400 missile crisis
Türkiye-EU Relations	– Almost complete coordination on all levels (political, economic, security…etc)	– Disagreements over the refugee issue- Eastern Mediterranean Case- Libyan Crisis
Turkish-Saudi Relations	– Agreement on the Syrian crisis and the position on the Houthis in Yemen	– Severe tension in relations began with the blockade of Qatar.
Turkish-Emirati Relations	– Tension since the military coup in Egypt	– Growing disputes over several cases; the blockade of Qatar, Libya, and the UAE’s support for Greece in the eastern Mediterranean
Turkish-Iranian Relations	– Disagreement over the Syrian crisis	– Rapprochement and more coordination in the Syrian case
Turkish-Egyptian Relations	– Severe tension, as a result of several differences that began with the coup against Mohamed Morsi	– The two countries began exchanging delegations and negotiating to resolve differences
Turkish-Libyan Relations	– Maintained diplomatic relations	– Intervene and support the Government of National Accord politically and militarily

12. Conclusion 

The Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant change in the last five years due to the adoption of the Blue Homeland, the Zero-problems, and Peace at Home, Peace in the world doctrines.

Internationally, there was a dispute over some cases between Türkiye and the United States, especially regarding purchasing the S-400 missiles and Türkiye’s rapprochement with Russia. The differences were somewhat severe, yet Türkiye maintained strategic relations with America.

Türkiye’s relations with the EU were fluctuating and had several differences regarding the delimitation of the water boundary in the eastern Mediterranean, the Libyan crisis, and the refugees’ issue. However, the economic relations were preserved as trade and technology transfer play important roles in both directions.  

Despite the severe differences, Türkiye maintains its strategic alliance with the EU and U.S. under the umbrella of NATO, an alliance that is considered one of the constants in its foreign policy.

Notwithstanding their historical enmity, Türkiye and Russia have managed to achieve high trade exchange and reach an agreement on various regional issues. They have also coordinated in many cases, such as Syria, Azerbaijan, Libya, and the Black Sea. However, the competition over the control of the Black Sea is threatening the stability of the foreign policy relationships of Türkiye and Russia, making it hard to reach a stage of a strategic relationship.

Regionally, Turkish relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE became tense after Türkiye stood by Qatar in the blockade imposed on it, and to a greater extent with the UAE due to the dispute over several other cases, resulting in a decline in the mutual economic relations between them.

After a phase of competition for influence in Syria, Türkiye moved to coordinate with Iran, following several developments inside Syria

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80. Malezya’n?n Ekonomisi. T.C. D??i?leri Bakanl???. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/malezya-ekonomisi.tr.mfa . Accessed January 18, 2022.
81. Y?ld?z Ö. As?rlar öncesine dayanan Türkiye-Malezya ili?kileri h?zla geli?iyor. Aa.com.tr. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/asirlar-oncesine-dayanan-turkiye-malezya-iliskileri-hizla-gelisiyor/1540923 . Published 2019. Accessed January 18, 2022.
82. Türkiye – Malezya ?li?kileri. T.C. D??i?leri Bakanl???. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-malezya-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa . Accessed January 18, 2022.
83. Mercan A. Ertu?rul F?rkateyni ile ba?layan Türk-Japon ili?kileri güçlenerek geni?liyor. Aa.com.tr. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/ertugrul-firkateyni-ile-baslayan-turk-japon-iliskileri-guclenerek-genisliyor/1989194 . Published 2020. Accessed January 18, 2022.
84. Türkiye – Japonya Siyasi ?li?kileri. T.C. D??i?leri Bakanl???. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-japonya-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa . Accessed January 18, 2022.
85. Türkiye – Afganistan Siyasi ?li?kileri. T.C. D??i?leri Bakanl???. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afganistan_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa . Accessed January 18, 2022.
86. ?????? ?, ?????? ?. ??? ????? ????? ???? 5 ????? | ??????? ????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ???? 2015 – 2020. ???? ???????? ??????? ????? ??????. https://ayam.com.tr/ar/??????/turkish-military-bases-arabic/ . Published 2021. Accessed January 18, 2022.
87. Türkiye – Afganistan Siyasi ?li?kileri. T.C. D??i?leri Bakanl???. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afganistan_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa . Accessed January 18, 2022.
88. ????? ???? ??? ?????? ?? ?????????. ?????. https://www.alhurra.com/Türkiye/2021/08/25/?????-????-???-??????-?????????. Published 2021. Accessed January 18, 2022. 
89. ???????? ??????? ???????? – ?????????. Ar.wikipedia.org. https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/????????_???????_???????? . Accessed January 18, 2022. 
90. Türkiye – Fas Siyasi ?li?kileri. T.C. D??i?leri Bakanl???. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-fas_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa . Accessed January 18, 2022.
91. ?????? ?. ??? ????? ????? ???? 5 ????? | ?????? ?? ????? ??? ???? 2015 – 2020. ???? ???????? ??????? ????? ??????. https://ayam.com.tr/ar/??????/how-has-Türkiye-changed-in-5-years-energy-in-Türkiye-between-2015-2020/ . Published 2021. Accessed January 18, 2022.
92. Türkiye – Cezayir Siyasi ?li?kileri. T.C. D??i?leri Bakanl???. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cezayir-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa . Accessed January 18, 2022.

13. Study Appendix 

In this appendix, we summarize the Turkish foreign relations with some countries as follows: 

13.1 Turkish-Chinese Relations

Türkiye’s relationship with China is based on the “zero problems” strategy that confirms the multidimensional foreign policy and openness to the East in a way that achieves balance and guarantees the Turkish interests. Therefore, Türkiye sought to strengthen mutual relations with China, as it is the most important economic and military country in the East and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. [74]

Although there is no strategic dispute or disagreement over interests of great political importance between the two countries, Turkish-Chinese relations were strained due to the Chinese government’s violations of human rights against the Muslim Uyghur Turks residing in eastern China. 

In 2018, Human Rights Watch submitted a report detailing the Chinese government’s campaign of “mass arbitrary detention, torture, forced political indoctrination, and mass surveillance of Muslims in Xinjiang in eastern China.”[75] In its turn, Türkiye stood against these acts and received a large number of Uyghurs on its lands.

Following several official visits in 2010, the relationship between Türkiye and China was upgraded to the level of strategic cooperation. The bilateral economic and political relations became more advantageous after China put forward the Belt and Road Initiative (Silk Road) that was signed by President Xi Jinping in 2015.[76]

 (For more information, see our study on the following link: https://ayam.com.tr/ar/??????/??????-?????-??????-???????-??????-2/ ) 

Economically, the trade volume between China and Türkiye amounted to about 24 billion dollars in 2020. During the last five years, the increase in Turkish exports to China led to a 7% decrease in the country’s foreign trade deficit, which was in favor of China. Moreover, major Chinese smartphone manufacturers such as Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo have made direct investments in Türkiye.[77]

President Erdogan’s four official visits to China in 2012, 2015, 2017, and 2019 are clear evidence of its political and economic importance and the need to strengthen ties with it at all levels.

13.2 Turkish-Malaysian Relations

In 1996, former Turkish Prime Minister Necmetttin Erbakan visited Malaysia. During his stay, he concluded several agreements in the defense industry and economic and cultural relations. 

Malaysia’s importance to Türkiye stems from being a country with advanced economic development, in addition to being Türkiye’s gateway to Southeast Asia. From this point of view, President Erdo?an (then Prime Minister) visited it in 2003, and relations reached their peak in all fields, as evidenced by the increase in economic exchanges between the two countries from $396 million to $1 billion.[78]

Between 2011-2014, the two countries exchanged official visits at the level of the Prime Minister, represented by President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an and then Malaysian Najib Rizk. These visits marked a new era in economic relations between the two countries and the signing of the Free Trade Agreement, which helped to promote investment and trade exchange.[79] Indeed, the trade volume between the two states increased in 2014 to $2 billion, and it reached $3.4 billion in 2017, with an aim to increase it to at least $5 billion in the future.[80]

Malaysia backed Türkiye after the July 15 failed coup attempt. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak declared that he stands by the Turkish government against the outlawed attempt to destroy democracy. In 2017, three high-ranking FETO members were arrested in Malaysia and handed over to Türkiye, boosting signs of friendship between the two countries.[81]

On July 27, 2019, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad paid an official visit to Türkiye. On December 19, 2019, President Erdo?an visited Malaysia within the framework of the Kuala Lumpur Summit. He signed fourteen Memorandum of Understanding that stipulate bilateral cooperation between companies operating in the defense industry.[82]

13.3 Turkish-Japanese Relations

Diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Japan date back to 1924, with two major historical events marking the foundation stone of their friendship. 

 1- The visit of the Ottoman Empire’s Ertugrul Frigate to Japan in 1890: 

The ship was carrying gifts and a message of friendship from Sultan Abdul Hamid II to the then Japanese Emperor Meiji, but a disaster occurred when the Frigate sank off the Japanese coast in 1890, resulting in the death of 532 sailors. 

The Japanese people showed a lot of sympathy to the families of the stricken crew, sent aid to them, and commemorated their memory annually. This was confirmed by former Prime Minister Shinz? Abe in his meeting with the grandchildren of the Ertu?rul martyrs during his visit to Türkiye in May 2013.[83]

2- Turkish Rescue of Japanese Citizens from Tehran

Turkish Airlines rescued a number of Japanese who were trapped in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in 1985 and evacuated them to Japan.[84]

During his visit in 2013, former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that bilateral relations had risen to the level of a strategic partnership. 

Japanese companies have participated in several huge projects in Türkiye, including the third bridge project in Istanbul, the metro project, and the Ba?ak?ehir Çam and Sakura Medical City project.

13.4 Turkish-Afghan Relations

Beginning with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the opening of a representative office for Türkiye in Kabul, Türkiye’s relationship with Afghanistan is one of the oldest foreign relations. The Turkish-Afghan Alliance Agreement was concluded in 1921. 

Moreover, Afghanistan is the second country to recognize the Turkish Republic, and the Turkish Embassy in Afghanistan is the first diplomatic mission opened in Kabul. 

By sending a large number of experts in various fields between 1920-1960, Türkiye played a role in developing Afghan state institutions in the military, cultural, education, and health sectors.[85]

During the American occupation of Afghanistan, Türkiye’s contribution was limited to supporting the efforts of the United Nations and NATO to protect Karzai International Airport in the capital, Kabul, and training some army officers.[86]

Within the framework of a conference held in Brussels to collect aid in 2004, Türkiye assisted Afghanistan with nearly 1.1 billion dollars, which is among the largest foreign aid programs Türkiye has ever offered to a foreign country.[87]

On October 18, 2014, Turkish President Erdo?an visited Afghanistan— the first president to visit in 46 years. During the visit, a strategic partnership and friendship agreement was signed between the two countries. Later, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made an official visit to Türkiye in 2015 at the invitation of President Erdogan.

In addition, Minister Çavu?o?lu visited Kabul on June 16, 2016, and held meetings with President Ghani. Also, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim visited Afghanistan on April 8, 2018, and met President Ashraf Ghani and then Chairman of the Executive Committee Abdullah Abdullah.

The Turkish forces stationed at Karzai Airport left after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces on August 31, 2021, which resulted in the collapse of the government in Kabul and the Taliban’s control of the country.[88]

With the absence of international recognition of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan until writing this study, the relationship between the two countries remains unidentified.

13.5 Turkish Relations with the Maghreb Countries

Türkiye has historical relations with the countries of the Maghreb (the Kingdom of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania) that extend back to the period of the Ottoman Empire.   

The Kingdom of Morocco

Although the Ottomans did not take control of lands in Morocco, they still maintained diplomatic relations with the Kingdom. They also participated in wars against Portugal and Spain.

To strengthen the political and economic relations with the Kingdom, Türkiye had a clear position concerning the Sahara conflict and supported the territorial integrity of Morocco.[89]

The signing of the Free Trade Agreement in 2006 increased the value of trade exchanges between the two countries, reaching $2.8 billion in 2018. 

In 2013, Türkiye’s Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto?lu visited Morocco and signed the agreement for the establishment of the High-level Strategic Cooperation Council (YDSK). 

The number of Turkish businesses operating in Morocco has increased significantly in the last few years and reached 160. They mainly work in contracting, construction, wholesale and retail trade, textiles, furniture, iron and steel, carpets, foodstuffs, and ready-made garments. Türkiye has undertaken various projects in Morocco worth over $4.1 billion; nearly 8000 Moroccans are employed in these investments.[90]

Algeria

Algeria’s association with the socialist system prevented the development of Turkish-Algerian relations, given that Türkiye was part of NATO and the Western system. However, the obstacles that once hindered the strengthening of ties largely disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Respectively, the mutual visits of high-level delegations increased, the “Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation” was signed in 2006, and Türkiye became Algeria’s strategic partner along with Spain, Italy, and Portugal.

In 2018, President Erdo?an visited Algeria and signed seven agreements, two of which were trade deals.

Notably, Algeria ranks as Türkiye’s fourth natural gas supplier and is considered important in promoting Türkiye’s resource diversification policy.[91]

In terms of developing Turkish investments, Algeria enjoys a large geographical area and a population of more than 40 million people. It is also the fourth-largest economy in the African continent.[92]