The Biden administration decided to return the Iranian nuclear agreement that was withdrawn by the Trump administration in 2018. It is expected that the revitalization of the deal  would enable Iran to throw the United States (US) sanctions off and to reach the blocked funds. For regional countries, Iran had been instrumentalizing these funds with the aim of boosting its influence in the region. On the other hand, the fact that the US has withdrawn its security umbrella from its regional allies urged regional countries to have embarked on the formation of a new alliance without the US.[1] In particular, the Biden administration did not take a sharp stand against the Houthi movement, which the US delisted as a foreign terrorist organization. Against the backdrop, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been in search of pulling Syria and Lebanon out of Iranian influence gradually and circling them in the Arabic sphere.[2] In addition, Gulf countries signed the al-Ula declaration last year and formally ended the dispute with Qatar.[3]

Looking at the big picture, it seems that a new axis against Iran was formed with the US, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia following the former US President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2017. During the tenure of the Trump administration, almost every country in the Middle East tried to have a close relationship with Israel in order to assure the security of their regimes by means of US assistance.[4] The new axis against Iran was involved in Israel, UAE, and Bahrain with Abraham Accords in 2020. Israel and regional countries strive to adopt a new order in which Iran could play an aggressive role as soon as the nuclear talks are in progress. Indeed, Tehran had used the nuclear agreement with the Obama administration to strengthen its presence in Syria and Iraq.[5] As part of this process, Türkiye and Israel decided to solve the rift in their relations. The relationship between two countries has witnessed a relationship with ups and downs as Turkey criticizes Israel’s aggression to the Palestianian people’s rights and Israel problematizes Türkiye’s relations with Hamas. These two issues structurally keep the Türkiye-Israel relationship in a restricted environment.

2. Evolution of Israeli Foreign Policy

The founding doctrine of Israeli foreign policy, The Periphery Doctrine (PD), sorted the regional countries into two groups. The first group was the Arab countries, which were seen as an existential threat to Israel’s security. The countries in the first group had advocated the ideal of Pan-Arabism with the dynamism of the Nasserist wave. In the second group, there were minority groups in Arab countries and non-Arab peripheral countries such as Türkiye and Iran. According to the periphery strategy, Israel could cooperate against the existential threat to Israel from Arab countries.

However, Israel’s perception of security has undergone a dramatic evolution in the process. While Israel has signed normalization agreements with the two states (Egypt and Jordan) with the longest border, there is a complete internal disturbance in Israel’s northern neighbor countries, Syria and Lebanon. Iran-backed groups in Syria and Lebanon have become the main threat to Israel. In the historical process, Israel’s threat perception has moved from the first group of countries to the second group of other countries. Yoel Guzansky accounts for this situation through the “Reverse Periphery Doctrine” (RPD).[6] This concept states that Israel’s most prominent regional threat comes from Iran and Türkiye. Contrary to the Periphery Doctrine, Israel develops its relations with the countries in the first group in response to threats from the second group. 

Although Guzansky puts Türkiye and Iran in the same category, there are essential differences between the historical course and current situation of Israel-Türkiye relations and Iran-Israel relations:

• The Iranian Islamic Revolution has been a severe breaking point regarding Iran-Israel relations. Although Türkiye-Israel relations followed a fluctuating graphic, they did not break apart.
• Even in the most challenging periods of relations, cooperation between the two countries in specific areas such as trade and intelligence continued steadily. The doors of dialogue between Türkiye and Israel have never been completely closed.
• While Iran and Israel act with opposite goals in conflict areas such as Syria and Lebanon, there are common goals between Türkiye and Israel on these issues.[7]
• Despite continuing relations with Hamas, Israel continued to get closer with Türkiye.[8] On the other hand, Iran is considered a monolithic threat by the Israeli security elite, along with its proxies.

When considering these points, it is necessary to evaluate the relations between the two countries with their unique characteristics.

3. Factors Affecting Türkiye-Israel Rapprochement

3.1: Security: When the history of relations between the two countries is examined, we can see that common security concerns constitute a basis of bilateral relations. In the 1990s, when relations were at their peak, the bilateral ties focused on defense and security cooperation.[9] Although the military’s domination over the Turkish political life gradually disappeared with the AK Party era, intelligence cooperation and bilateral trade continued even in the tensest periods of relations between the two countries.[10]

Israel is one of the countries most affected by the shrinking of the US security umbrella in the Middle East due to the US withdrawal from the region. Unlike Israel, the other allies of the US follow a two-way preventive strategy against Iran based on both dialogue and defense. For example, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, develop new cooperations with countries such as Russia and China in trade and defense areas. On the other hand, they strive to maintain their relations with the US to a large extent. Alternatively, Israel continues to implement a melt containment strategy on Iran. That’s why Israel attempted to normalize some Arabic countries. Notwithstanding, the Arabic countries which have normalized their relationship with Israel have different expectations from the normalization process with Israel.[11] Israel interprets the process as an attempt to create a regional defense bloc against Iran. Although this goal of Israel does not fully comply with the regional countries’ goals, the fact that Israel somehow surrounded Iran with diplomatic steps is considered a success.

Türkiye is of great importance in Israel’s strategy to contain Iran. When evaluating the spheres of influence of the two countries, Türkiye and Israel have been on the brink of the rapprochement. For instance, the two countries’ common interests in Azerbaijan seriously disturb Iran.[12] Türkiye and Azerbaijan are threatened in the video allegedly shared from a channel belonging to the Revolutionary Guards.[13] In addition, Reuters claimed that the Iranian missile attack targeted a villa in Erbil where the negotiations of Israeli gas transfer to Türkiye via the KRG were held.[14] All of them point to Türkiye’s strategic position against the Iranian threat in the eyes of Israel.

3.2: Economy: It is noteworthy that even in the most difficult periods of the Türkiye-Israel relationship, the trade volume between the two countries has steadily been increasing. Many analyzes published in the Israeli media about the rapprochement argue that the recent depreciation of the Turkish Lira has pushed Ankara to a more moderate approach to its foreign policy. In the press statement held after the bilateral meeting with Herzog, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphasized the size of the trade volume between the two countries and announced the goal of reaching 10 billion dollars in 2022. Before and after the meeting, business people from both countries made mutual visits.[15]

There are many Turkish companies operating actively in Israel. Especially in the building materials and construction sector, Turkish companies are the second-largest supplier after China.[16] In addition, the Jenin Organized Industrial Zone (OIZ), which is still under construction and carried out by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye (TOBB) Industry for Peace initiative, has substantial potential in terms of the two countries’ trade volume.[17] Although it is a project that has been going on for a long time, essential steps have been taken in the last period to complete the project, and it is expected that Jenin OIZ will become operational at the end of 2022.[18]

3.3: Politics: Türkiye-US relationship has played an important role in the recent rapprochement of Türkiye-Israel relations. The Turkish ambassador to Washington, Hasan Murat Mercan, who had critical contacts with leading figures of the Jewish Community in the US, considerably impacted the rapprochement process.[20] In addition, a joint memorandum was signed between the Turkish-American National Steering Committee (TASC), known for its close relations with Türkiye, and the Orthodox Jewish Chamber of Commerce (OJC). The declaration included items such as combating antisemitism and islamophobia and promoting bilateral trade and business relations. Yet TASC had to announce its withdrawal from this declaration due to public reactions.[21]

This active role played by Mercan’s contact with Jewish groups in the US point to one of the main motivations that pushed Türkiye to get closer to Israel. The Tel Aviv administration and Jewish groups in the US significantly impact the Washington administration. The step towards rapprochement with Israel and Jewish groups was taken to soften the US-Türkiye relations, which entered a bad period with the Biden administration taking office. In this new period, the regional countries act on a bilateral balance to maximize their interests. For pragmatic reasons, the regional countries seek to enhance their relations with those countries with disagreements. Because of the new regional strategy of the US, the possibility of Iran returning to the nuclear agreement, the increasing Iranian threat in the region, and the Russia-Ukraine war, many uncertainties emerge for the future of the region.

While a new regional order is taking shape, Türkiye is following a pragmatic approach by making minimum concessions from its principles. Türkiye condemned the terror attacks at the lowest diplomatic level to protect relations with Israel in terms of its interests. Conversely, Türkiye’s ministry of foreign affairs censured Israel’s aggressions against the Palestinians during Ramadan month, which reflects the balance of principle-interest. Finally, the Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu emphasised that Türkiye’s relations with Israel depend on Israel’s Palestinian policies. Türkiye adheres to the principle by balancing its interest.

3.4: East Mediterranean and Energy: One of the main topics of the Türkiye-Israel rapprochement is undoubtedly the Eastern Mediterranean and Energy issue. When Türkiye-Israel relations were tense, Israel sought to develop diplomatic ties alternative to Turkey. In this process, an anti-Türkiye bloc was raised in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel established a tripartite framework in 2016 with Greece and the Greek Cyprus administration to improve defense and economic ties. The cooperation deepened much around energy diplomacy. Signed in 2020 by the three countries, the East-Med project traced out an undersea conduit to carry Israel’s Leviathan gas field, which, with reserves of 620 billion cubic meters, could supply 10-12 billion cubic meters a year to Europe via Cyprus and Greece.[22] However, the project collapsed in January 2022 as the Biden administration rescinded US support. 

With the Russia-Ukraine war, alternative energy sources to Russian gas in energy security have come to the top agenda for Western countries. One of the alternatives is Israeli transfer to Europe to ensure production stability in Israel’s natural gas fields.[23] A possible pipeline to bring the Israeli gas to Europe through Türkiye has been recently seen technically and fiscally as the best feasible solution. The inadequacy of Israeli gas to meet the needs of Europe (326 billion cubic meters a year) required to add the gas extracted from the countries of the region to this line.[24] The pipeline through Türkiye would run around 500 kilometers and cost up to $1,5 billion to build, while the EastMed project has envisioned a 1,900-kilometer pipeline running from Israel to Cyprus and then to Greece and Italy at the  cost of some $7.9 billion.[25] On the other hand, Israel does not want to risk a rupture with Greece and the Greek Cyprus administration.[26] Indeed, there are disagreements in the East Mediterranean, such as continental shift, maritime boundaries, and Cyprus problem to improve gas projects.[27] Because of leading the anti-Türkiye bloc, Israel thinks that developing its relations with Türkiye at the expense of these countries will seriously damage its international image and credibility.[28] In the last instance, the Turkish route to carry Israeli gas to Europe has the above-noted actual or potential problems in the East Mediterranean.[29] The other caveat of transfer via pipeline is that the EU’s vision on the climate crisis aims to decrease the gas share in its energy basket by 25 percent by 2030 and zero it out by 2050.[30] Consequently, Europe’s LNG imports have considerably increased.[31]

Israel also considers different alternatives in terms of energy transfer. Israel could plan to pipe its gas to Egypt’s liquefied natural gas plants for conservation of LNG and export by ship to Europe, regarded as the only way to overcome the political obstacles.[32] In this case, Israel would use Egyptian LNG facilities or build a liquefaction plant in the Leviathan field. As another alternative, EuroAsia Interconnector, a project carried out jointly by the Israel-Greek Cypriot Administration, is pointed out.[33] This project aims to integrate the electricity infrastructure of the three countries. It is envisaged that the Israeli gas transfer to Europe would be drawn on electricity generation. Similar to the EastMed project, there are some question marks about this project in terms of cost, implementation, and construction time.

4. What does the Turkish-Israeli relationship put in the regional issues?

The rapprochement of Türkiye and Israel will not change Türkiye’s current position on the Palestine issue and particularly Türkiye’s Hamas policies that Israel problematizes. Türkiye stressed that the Israel administration should not pursue policies that would jeopardize the two-state solution and not prevent the TIKA and the Turkish Red Crescent from carrying out activities in the region to improve the living conditions of the Palestinians.[34] Türkiye underlined the importance of the historical status of Jerusalem and the preservation of the religious identity and sanctity of Masjid Al-Aqsa. It is remarkable considering Arab leaders signing normalization deals with Israel failed to give importance to these issues.[35] So far, the new Israeli government has not put forward a game-changing policy related to both settlements and the two-state solution.[36] Finally, Israel urged Ankara to take some steps against the presence of Hamas leaders in Türkiye before launching reconciliation talks.[37] Türkiye views Hamas as the official representative of the Palestine people. Therefore, Türkiye has not taken steps backward in its relationship with Hamas, even when it comes to recalibrating the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv. 

Striving to rein in Iranian influence, the UAE, Bahrain, and recently Jordan and Egypt seek to reduce the vacuum in Syria by normalizing relations with Assad. Israel is aware that Iran will preserve its influence via Hezbollah, seen as a vital foe by Israel in Syria. Given the situation in which the Assad regime is unable to control the entire country, Israel would keep open a dialogue with the PYD that Türkiye designated a terrorist organization to oppose the consolidation of the Iranian presence.[38] As a result, the rapprochement of Türkiye and Israel does not converge the two countries’ interests in Syria. Even Israel’s aid to the PYD could deteriorate the normalization of Türkiye and Israel. Israel not merely denounced Türkiye’s operation in northern Syria in 2019 but also expressed its support for the independence referendum in Iraq’s Kurdish region in 2017.[39]

A series of regional summits were organized to generate an alliance between Israel and Arabic countries. The aim of these summits is to discuss how the regional countries counterbalance Iran in the environment of the new regional dynamics resulting from the continuation of the American pivot to Asia. In one of these meetings, the Negev summit, the main agenda of the attendees was “Iran issue.” Although Egypt, UAE, and Morocco expressed their support for the two-state solution that proposed a framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they have come closer with Israel to achieve their interests.[40] Türkiye’s rapprochement with Israel and UAE could mean cementing ties with countries that could counterbalance Iran. The expectation of a more aggressive Iran may have been a catalyst for the rapprochement of Israel and the UAE with Türkiye. Although Turkish officials spoke out that their relationship with Israel is not an alliance against Iran, it is expected that Türkiye and Iran will be rivals in Syria and Iraq. Türkiye-supported soldiers of the Syrian National Army have faced Iranian-backed Shia militias in Idlib, Syria. In addition, Iran seeks to keep Türkiye busy in the north of Iraq with the PKK; Türkiye has brought the Sunni parties together after they won a substantial number of seats.[41] Türkiye also is interested in boosting its natural gas cooperation with the Kurdish regional government. This is to say that Türkiye has a desire to reduce its energy dependence on Iran.[42] Amidst the rivalry between Türkiye and Iran, the Turkish-Israeli relationship might develop in intelligence cooperation in the region. In fact, events first in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and then in Afghanistan in 2021 reapproached the Turkish-Israel relationship before the war in Ukraine started.

5. Conclusion

The recent activities of Israel and its allies in the region can be considered as preparation steps for a new Middle East process without superpowers. Parallel to the US’s strategy of withdrawing from the region, there has been a severe decrease in the security guarantees offered by the US to the regional countries, which has pushed them to seek new ones. This process underlies the formation of a moderate foreign policy atmosphere. Whereas the anti-Iran axis has ostensibly countered Iran, the main target of the axis was initially also Türkiye in accordance with leaked information from meetings between the relevant countries. 

Since 2016, when Türkiye and Israel declared their ambassadors as persona non grata, Israel has pursued a foreign policy against Türkiye’s vital interest in the region. Israel has cooperated with Greece and the Greek Cyprus administration in the East Mediterranean, supported the attempted independence referendum of Kurds in Iraq, and ultimately cheered on the US’s confrontation against Türkiye. In 2016, Türkiye and Israel had discussed a way to import Israeli gas as part of a reconciliation deal after years of tensions resulting from Israel’s Gaza flotilla raid in 2010. However, the negotiations collapsed in 2018 over Israeli violations at Jerusalem and Gaza.[43] We can conclude that the Turkish-Israeli relationship would not deepen unless Türkiye cut off relations with Hamas on the one hand and Israel minded Palestinians’ rights on the other hand.[44] As in the past, the Türkiye-Israeli relationship could be limited to bilateral trade.

References

1.  https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/orta-doguda-abdnin-yer-almadigi-yeni-ittifak-arayislari-gundemde/2556453 
2.  https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/orta-doguda-abdnin-yer-almadigi-yeni-ittifak-arayislari-gundemde/2556453 
3.  https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/change-in-turkish-foreign-policy-toward-the-middle-east 
4.  https://fikirturu.com/jeo-strateji/turkiye-israil-normallesmesinin-yeni-dinamikleri/ 
5.  https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/the-rising-turkey-effect-in-the-gulf 
6.   https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12579 
7.   https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-israel-share-common-interest-in-syria-netanyahu-30193 
8.   https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-696651 
9.   https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/539675 
10.   https://www.bbc.com/turkce/live/haberler-dunya-55444226 
11.   https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-israel-the-negev-summit-was-all-about-iran-for-other-participants-not-so-much/ 
12.   https://iramcenter.org/iran-azerbaycan-geriliminin-arka-plani/?send_cookie_permissions=OK 
13.   https://www.trhaber.com/iran-dan-skandal-turkiye-videosu-acik-acik-tehdit-ettiler-video,5461.html 
14.   https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/exclusive-iran-struck-iraq-target-over-gas-talks-involving-israel-officials-2022-03-28/ 
15.   https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/turk-ve-israilli-is-insanlari-karsilikli-ticareti-artirmayi-hedefliyor/2527504 
16.   https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-design-and-construction 
17.   Türkiye-Palestine trade is evaluated within the Türkiye-Israel trade volume. 
18.   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZIfgk_EB-M 
19.  https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=Dis-Ticaret-104 
20.   https://www.timesofisrael.com/behind-israels-rekindled-flame-with-turkey-a-rabbi-with-a-penchant-for-matchmaking/ 
21.  https://twitter.com/ourtasc/status/1440823412243382274 
22.  https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/can-turkey-benefit-europes-quest-reduce-russian-gas 
23.   https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/business/energy-environment/israel-natural-gas-offshore.html 
24.  https://menaaffairs.com/turkish-israeli-rapprochement-cooperation-and-problem-areas/ 
25.  https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/01/could-new-israeli-gas-pipeline-bridge-long-standing-rift-turkey 
26.  https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-turkey-intelligence-closer-gas-pipeline-ahead-may 
27.  https://www.orsam.org.tr//d_hbanaliz/turkiye-israil-iliskilerinde-yeni-gelismeler-ve-israilin-surece-bakisi.pdf 
28.   https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001405438 
29.  https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/no-magic-tap-europe-replace-russian-gas-turkey 
30.  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0773&from=EN , p. 5.
31.  https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/01/could-new-israeli-gas-pipeline-bridge-long-standing-rift-turkey 
32.   https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001405438 
33.   https://jiss.org.il/he/lerman-the-presidents-game/   
34.  https://menaaffairs.com/turkish-israeli-rapprochement-cooperation-and-problem-areas/ 
35.  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220311-turkiye-did-not-discard-the-palestinians-to-repair-ties-with-israel/ 
36.  https://menaaffairs.com/turkish-israeli-rapprochement-cooperation-and-problem-areas/ 
37. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-turkey-intelligence-closer-gas-pipeline-ahead-may
38.  https://www.inss.org.il/publication/northern-arena-2022/ 
39.  https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/10/25/what-is-behind-the-israeli-outrage-over-turkeys-syria-operation 
40. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/zirvelerin-golgesinde-orta-doguda-degisen-politikalar/2554441 
41.  https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/a-new-era-of-turkish-iranian-competition-may-be-on-the-horizon-55209 
42.  https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/will-renewed-interest-iraqi-kurdish-gas-fuel-turkey-iran-rivalry 
43.  https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-tells-israel-it-no-longer-supports-eastmed-pipeline-project-report 
44.  https://www.orsam.org.tr//d_hbanaliz/turkiye-israil-iliskilerinde-yeni-gelismeler-ve-israilin-surece-bakisi.pdf 

This series of studies review the remarkable developments in Türkiye’s international, regional, and internal status over the last five years (2015-2020) that witnessed qualitative and fundamental changes, including the failed coup in 2016, the restructuring of the Turkish State, the referendum, and transforming the government into the Presidential System. 

There were also many international and regional changes— most notably, Donald Trump becoming the United States President and the changes in the States Administration’s priorities after Joe Biden took over. It is equally important to mention the effective direction of Türkiye’s foreign policy towards international issues such as Syria and Libya and its increasing role in Africa and Central Asia.

Finally, the economic, social, and political changes imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Our studies cover Türkiye’s energy, military industrialization, foreign relations, internal status, economy, external military interventions, and military bases beyond national borders.

As Türkiye faces many challenges while moving forward, we hope to shed light on the facts of Türkiye’s current regional and international position compared to five years ago.

Dr. Mustafa Al-Wahaib
Director of Anadolu Center for Near East Studies 

1. Introduction

Türkiye’s foreign policy has undergone significant changes since 2015 due to the various developments in the country’s political and diplomatic positions.

Domestically, the Turkish foreign policy course was severely affected by the failed coup in 2016 and the transition to the presidential system in 2017.

Internationally, Türkiye has been involved in many issues related to the unstable region, like the conflict over energy resources, the delimitation of maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean, and military intervention abroad.

It is also important to mention Türkiye’s stance towards the Arab Spring and its support for Qatar during the Gulf Crisis, which critically affected its relations with some Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia.

In this study, we comprehensively analyze Türkiye’s foreign relations with regional and international powers since 2015.

Although there are some countries that have a constant relationship with Türkiye, we found it important to cite them in the appendix of our study.

2. Key Drivers of the Turkish Foreign Policy

Identifying the so-called “inputs and outputs” as a tool of analysis, in addition to the traditions and experiences that form the constants of the country’s foreign policy, is essential in studying external relations. Furthermore, we apply the principle of variables to analyze the changes in the foreign policy of Türkiye.  

In this context, Türkiye’s foreign policy is shaped by a variety of factors:

1- The political ideology of its governing elite (i.e., Kemalism).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s ideological framework laid out the path that Türkiye’s foreign policy would follow, regardless of the different orientations of the successive Turkish governments. 

The Kemalism principles include the following:

– Secularism: 

In order to maintain a modern and more comprehensive society, secularism was considered a necessary component. It covered the political and governmental, as well as the cultural life.[1] Thus, according to Atatürk’s principle, the state may not build or adopt internal or external policies on a religious basis as in the past.

– Nationalism

As defined by Atatürk, geographical, political, cultural, and historical unity is the framework of Nationalism. There are also influential factors that established the Turkish Nation, including the unity in political existence, language, origin, ancestry, and common history.[2]

– Republicanism 

Republicanism was the main principle of Atatürk’s revolution. It became the basis of the new Turkish state and has been preserved in its constitutions since 1924. Atatürk said that “the form of government which provides the most modern and logical application of the principle of democracy is the republic, which is the most appropriate administration to the nature and customs of the Turkish nation.”[3]

2- The History Factor:

Turkish foreign policy is based on the Ottoman Empire’s cultural and historical context. Its legacy contributed to the revival of Türkiye’s regional role, especially with Islamic and Arab countries. The consequences of this legacy are fundamentally reflected in Türkiye’s foreign policy, as well.[4]

3- The Geopolitical and Geostrategic Location

Türkiye’s privileged geographic location— a land bridge linking Europe and Asia— is a key driver in its foreign policy. However, it makes it more vulnerable to international developments and imbalances, and as put by former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, it created the “national security syndrome.” 

In this context, Türkiye’s foreign policy and security were affected by the repercussions of the conflict in its immediate regional neighborhood. This included the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the continued development of Eastern Europe; the crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the Balkans; the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, and Abkhazia in the Caucasus; and the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq after the 1990-1991 Gulf War. 

As a part of the Middle East, Türkiye has experienced general insecurity caused by the instability in the region, such as the Arab-Israeli wars, the first and second Gulf wars, and the state of the security vacuum and conflicts after the Arab Spring revolutions.[5]

2.1 Constants of Turkish foreign policy

The constants in foreign policy define the state’s fixed orientations toward regional and global issues.

The constants in Turkish foreign policy can be sorted as follows: 

• NATO Membership: maintaining its membership in the largest military alliance in the world.
• Affiliation to Europe: Türkiye is a founding member of almost all European institutions, including the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
• The Strategic Partnership with the United States: the compass of Turkish foreign policy has been consistent with the direction of the United States since the founding of the modern Turkish Republic.
• Expansion into Central Asia and the Caucasus: due to the linguistic and ethnic ties, Türkiye has a constant foreign policy toward the Turkish republics (Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. 
• Black Sea security: relations with Russia and the safety of the Black Sea form a strategic focus in Türkiye’s foreign policy.[6]

2.2 Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy

In terms of foreign policy, change is a political phenomenon that includes a wide range of relative adoptions that can be simple but frequent and do not affect the country’s main course of foreign policy. The change, however, can be radical, not frequent, and requires restructuring of foreign policy and persuading the bureaucratic government agencies and society (if the system is democratic) to bring about this change.[7]

“According to the regional and international political variables, the Middle East and the Balkans are the most critical files that witnessed Türkiye’s foreign policy change.”

2.2.1 The Middle East

Türkiye-Arab relations were characterized by political stagnation in the 1950s, but they changed relatively along with the fall of the Soviet Union. Notably, a rapprochement with Arab and regional countries emerged with the AK Party’s arrival to power.[8]

2.2.2 Russia and the Balkans

Enmity has always prevailed in Turkish-Russian relations. During the Cold War, the confrontation increased after Türkiye sided with the Western camp and joined NATO to face the Soviet expansion in the Middle East and Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Russia and Türkiye started to take a significant role in their foreign policy.[9] This change was evident through the implementation of gas pipeline projects to export Russian gas to Türkiye.[10] During the AK Party’s rule, the value of trade exchange between the two countries increased.[11]

During the Cold War, the Turkish foreign policy paid particular attention to the Balkans region as it was considered a forward base for the Western bloc. Although this strategic importance was subjected to fluctuations caused by political influences, Türkiye benefited greatly, and the Balkans became a priority for Türkiye during the war in Bosnia—that priority declined after the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the Bosnian war, and the restoration of stability in the region.[12]

2.3 Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies

Türkiye’s foreign policy is based on three main strategies: 

2.3.1 Peace at Home, Peace in the World

Since the state’s founding, Türkiye’s international engagement has been influenced by the Peace at Home, Peace in the World strategy, formulated by the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[13]

The strategy is based on resorting to peace in foreign relations by adhering to international law. Accordingly, Türkiye followed that tactic to maintain its independence during the major powers’ wars in Europe, a disengagement that enabled Türkiye to avoid the mandate in the event of its defeat.[14]

2.3.2 Zero Problems with Neighbors

Articulated by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Zero Problems strategy aims to establish friendly relations with the region’s countries based on the following principles:

• The balance between security and freedom: that the freedom of expression and democracy should be protected in a way that is not detrimental to the state
• Zero problems with neighbors: like ending the problems of Syria and Cyprus, and normalizing relations with Armenia
• Multidimensional foreign policy: not relying on one international party, i.e., the Western camp, and openness to the East as well, in a way that achieves balance and guarantees Turkish interests
• Active regional policy: strengthening ties with regional countries and activating the Turkish role in the region
• New diplomatic style: abandoning the long-standing differences that dominate the foreign policy agenda and drain its energy in international relations

Work on this strategy started after the Justice and Development Party’s rise to power in 2002, and it has been implemented in various initiatives, such as addressing the Cyprus problem, curbing military actions in Syria, normalizing relations with Armenia, and strengthening bonds with developing international regions such as Asia, Latin America, and Africa.[15]

“Türkiye maintained a soft power diplomacy strategy that is focused on avoiding interference in other countries until 2015.”

2.3.3 Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan)

The concept of the Blue Homeland Doctrine emerged from a plan drawn up by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz in 2006. It was later crystallized by retired Admiral Prof. Dr. Cihat Yaycı, Head of Naval and Strategic Research at Bahçeşehir University.

Representing Türkiye’s Hard Power, Mavi Vatan emphasizes Türkiye’s expansion and influence in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and the Black Sea through a combination of military and diplomatic means that would enable Türkiye to access energy and other economic resources.

In 2015, President Erdoğan adopted the Blue Homeland Doctrine as part of a national strategy of “forward defense” in the context of his ongoing endeavors to assert Türkiye’s independence in all aspects of foreign policy to include influence in the surrounding regions.[16]

Under this doctrine, Türkiye seems more willing to use military force to implement its vision, objectives, and policy. This has been evidenced by the deployment of Turkish military frigates to secure oil exploration in the eastern Mediterranean, the military intervention in Libya, and the support for allies like Qatar and Azerbaijan with military forces.

Check how the Turkish military industry changed in five years in a previous study by AYAM. [17]

3. Turkish-Russian Relations

Türkiye and Russia have had a turbulent relationship due to their history of conflict. For the most part, the Russian Empire’s ambition to take over parts of the Ottoman Empire, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles strait, led to the Twelve Wars that extended for centuries, summarized in Table No. (1).

The conflict between the interests of the two countries remained between 2015 and 2020. These conflicts were mainly due to Russia’s military expansion in various regions, including Syria, Armenia, the separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Libya. Justifiably, Türkiye was worried about a military encirclement by Russia.

A golden age followed with the AK Party taking power in Türkiye, and economic ties solidified the relations between the two countries. Indeed, Russia is Türkiye’s top trading partner. In 2019, the two countries’ total trade volume amounted to 26 billion US dollars. The value of Turkish exports was 3.854 billion US dollars, while imports reached 22.454 billion US dollars. In addition, Energy projects such as the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the TurkStream gas pipeline, and the Blue Streamline form the solid basis for the relations between the two countries. Likewise, the cooperation between Türkiye and Russia in tourism is essential for their bilateral relations. In 2019, over 7 million Russian tourists visited Türkiye.[18]

3.1 The Black Sea Security

The fact that the security of the Black Sea ranks among the constants in Turkish foreign policy sparked several wars with Russia, which sought to reach the warm waters for a long time. Being unable to control the straits, Russia had to sign treaties with Türkiye and other countries to regulate the passage of ships of all shapes and sizes in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits.

Montreux Convention:

The treaty was signed by Türkiye, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, and former Yugoslavia in 1936 in Switzerland. It was the last treaty to regulate the transit of ships through the Straits.

Terms of Treaty: 

• Authorizing the full Turkish control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles strait
• Regulating the passage of military vessels
• Ensuring complete freedom of navigation and passage for merchants vessels, under any flag with any cargo, in the straits in peacetime
• Allowing Türkiye to rearm its military on the side or near the straits
• Confirmation of Türkiye’s right to close the strait to foreign warships in times of war or when it is under threat of aggression
• Granting Türkiye the right to refuse the transit of commercial ships on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.
•  Non-Black-Sea states willing to send a vessel must notify Türkiye 8 days prior of their sought passing
• No more than nine foreign warships, with a total aggregate tonnage of 15,000 tons, may pass at any one time.
• Black Sea states may transit ships of any tonnage, escorted by no more than two destroyers.[19]

“Russia, the former Soviet Union’s heir, is the biggest recipient of the treaty as it owns the most naval and commercial ships and submarines.”

In a related context, The Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 allowed it to expand its naval capacity and space and shift the strategic balance in its favor, which Türkiye utterly opposed for many reasons:

1. Following the occupation of Crimea, Russia’s coastline expanded from 475 km to 1,200 km (about 25%of the total seafront). This is roughly the length of Türkiye’s shores on the Black Sea, which is 1,785 km ( about 35% of the total coastline).
2. With its military presence in Crimea, Russia has become geographically closer to the Turkish coast.[20]
3. The annexation also raised Türkiye’s concerns about the Crimean Tatars, who hold historically close ties to Türkiye.[21]

In its turn, Türkiye has responded by building up its military forces and encouraging NATO to deploy into the Black Sea, resulting in strategic consequences for both countries.

3.2 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Russia and Türkiye are profoundly engaged in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. While Moscow has a defense agreement with Armenia[212], Türkiye has a strategic partnership and a mutual support agreement with Azerbaijan and considers their relations as one of the Turkish foreign policy constants.[23]

In April 2016, Nagorno–Karabakh witnessed the worst escalation of violence since the ceasefire was signed in 1994. The Azerbaijani army made minor gains on the ground, but the operations led to heavy losses for both countries. In conjunction, tensions between Türkiye and Russia intensified following Türkiye’s downing of a Russian jet, which triggered a harsh exchange of words between the two countries.[24]

Russia has historically supported Armenia in its disputes with Azerbaijan. However, with the advent of an anti-Russian Armenian government after the revolution of 2018, Russia did not provide enough support to Armenia in the last war with Azerbaijan in late 2020. In contrast, Türkiye helped the Azerbaijan government with military consultations, weapons, and political support, which was enough for the Azerbaijani government to restore several occupied territories.[25]

3.3 Syrian War

Due to its geographic proximity and the growing threat posed by its internal instability, Syria has received a large share of Türkiye’s foreign policy priority. The Turkish-Russian intervention in Syria has greatly impacted their relationship. It started in 2012 as Türkiye supported the opposition to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria, while Russia deployed its forces there in 2015 to support the Syrian regime militarily. The Russian Air Force played a vital role in helping the Syrian regime’s forces, which were able to retake a large portion of the country from the opposition[26]. As a result, the relationship between Türkiye and Russia became strained due to the conflicting interests in the Syrian File and the downing of the Russian fighter by Türkiye in 2015.

In the same year, the two countries managed to overcome their crisis and improve their relations. They also coordinated their efforts in addressing the Syrian issue by offering political agreements such as the Astana and Sochi.[27]

3.4 Economic Relations

Due to Russia’s economic sanctions against Türkiye after the aircraft downing, the two countries’ trade rate decreased by a third, from $23.9 billion in 2015 to $16.8 billion in 2016. The tourism sector experienced the most significant recession, followed by the real estate sector, with a loss of up to ten billion dollars, more than 1% of Türkiye’s GDP. Meanwhile, exports of Russian gas, which account for the bulk of total trade between the two States, continued without restrictions.[28]

In late 2016, Russia lifted most of the economic sanctions imposed on Türkiye, and trade between the two countries increased by 37% in the first half of 2018 to reach $13.3 billion. Turkish exports to Russia rose by 47%, while imports from Russia increased by 36 percent. Furthermore, the Turkish Stream project was reactivated, and the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant was built to generate electricity.[29]

Thereupon, Türkiye and Russia established a joint fund to improve their economic relations. Its objective was to promote trade exchange between the two countries through their local currencies instead of the dollar.

On December 29, 2017, Türkiye strengthened its military defense cooperation with Russia by signing a contract with the Russian state-owned arms company, Almaz Central Design Bureau, to supply two batteries of S-400 missiles[30], which was rejected by the European Union and the United States.[31]

All things considered, Russia ranks as Türkiye’s second-largest economic partner after Germany in infrastructure, transport, energy, agriculture, and tourism.

4. Turkish-US Relations

Over the years, Türkiye has viewed its relations with the U.S. as strategic one. However, the two countries have experienced a significant rift during the past decade due to various disagreements, which kept them, even formally, from the path of their traditional relationship as members of NATO. 

The Most Prominent Cases of the Dispute: 

4.1 The American Pastor Detention

Andrew Brunson is an American pastor who lived in Türkiye for nearly twenty years and worked in the Izmir Resurrection Church. In October 2016, He was arrested by the Turkish authorities on charges of espionage and having links with the Gülen movement and PKK. In return, the U.S. Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on two ministers in the Turkish government.[32]

In August 2018, following several failed diplomatic efforts to release the pastor, former US President Donald Trump announced a new trade policy regarding the refusal of Turkish aluminum and steel imports. Still, the Turkish government rejected Trump’s arbitrary decision as it contravened the World Trade Organization rules.[33]

Signs of growing distrust between Türkiye and the U.S. reached their climax after the arrest of American and Turkish nationals working in the American consulate, for their links with the Gülen movement, according to the Turkish authorities.[34]

In October 2018, Andrew Brunson was released and returned to the United States. As a result, sanctions against Türkiye were partially lifted[35], but they caused a deterioration of relations between the two countries.

4.2 Gülen’s Extradition Demands 

Fethullah Gülen, who has lived in the U.S. since 1999, is considered the mastermind of the 2016 coup attempt. Hence, the Turkish government repeatedly demanded his extradition, but the U.S. government denied it, which exacerbated the tensions between the two.[36]

4.3 S-400 System Crisis

The U.S. rejected the Turkish demands to purchase the American “Patriot” air defense missile systems, which prompted Türkiye to turn to Russia to obtain S-400 air defense missile systems instead.

The U.S. opposed Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 missile system, claiming it would not be interoperable with NATO’s defense system, in addition to insecurity concerns that the next generation of F-35 fighter jets could be compromised by the S-400 system.[37] 

Following Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 missile system, the U.S. decided to terminate its participation in the F-35 program and threatened to impose economic sanctions against it[38]. At the same time, Türkiye responded that the missile system was necessary to protect its airspace.

4.4 YPG Support

Türkiye has continuously expressed its anger and condemnation of Washington’s support for the PKK terrorist organization’s Syrian wing (YPG) to fight ISIS. 

Moreover, Türkiye says the United States has disregarded its national security concerns in its partnership with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.[39]

The two countries’ relations became worse after the Turkish Forces’ operations were carried out against the “SDF” units in northwestern Syria in the city of Afrin in 2018 and northeastern Syria in the cities of Jarablus and Ras al-Ain in 2019.[40]

4.5 The American Perspective of the Turkish-Russian Confrontations

Both Türkiye and Russia are on the opposite sides of several military conflicts in different regions, such as Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In this respect, there are various interpretations of the U.S. political vision regarding the Türkiye-Russia confrontation.

– Some believe that Türkiye is a NATO ally, and it can be considered a counterbalance to Russia’s presence in the Middle East. More optimistically, the joint opposition to Russia can also be a basis for reviving the faltering US-Turkish relations.

The statements of former US Ambassador, the United States Special Representative for Syria Engagement, and the Special Envoy to the International military intervention against ISIL James Jeffrey came to confirm this vision. 

Jeffrey praised the Turkish role in Idlib and noted that Türkiye’s military mission in Syria could receive financial support from the US or NATO.[41]

– Another opinion states that Türkiye is out of control and is heading towards partnership with Russia in many fields. This idea argues that the growing number of Russian-Turkish bilateral agreements has strengthened the Russian-Turkish relations and is threatening the Western orientation of Türkiye.[42]

5. Türkiye-EU Relations

Türkiye’s relationship with the European Union is one of membership and mutual benefit, and the two sides share many issues related to their national security. Despite the recent dispute between the two parties, the relationship with the EU remains a constant in Türkiye’s foreign policy. Similarly, the EU states still find an important partner in Türkiye in many cases. This was confirmed by President Emmanuel Macron’s statement to the Kathimerini newspaper in September 2017:

“Türkiye had already moved away from the European Union, but I want to avoid the split. Türkiye is a vital partner in addressing the various crises we all face, especially the immigration challenge and the terrorist threat.”

Here, we highlight four major cases that played a role in shaping EU-Türkiye relations between 2015-2020:

5.1 Eastern Mediterranean and Energy Security

In December 2019, the European Council rejected the agreement between Türkiye and Libya regarding the delimitation of the water border between the two countries. The Council noted that this agreement violated the rights of the third parties and affirmed its solidarity with Cyprus and Greece against those actions by Türkiye.

In the same year, Türkiye escalated its security measures, escorting its drilling ships with military vessels in the eastern Mediterranean, a move that sparked strong opposition from the European Union and the threat of severe economic sanctions against Türkiye.[44]

At the request of Cyprus, on July 13, 2020, the foreign ministers of the European Union agreed to prepare additional listings within the framework of the existing sanctions on Türkiye’s drilling operations in the eastern Mediterranean. On July 23, French President Emmanuel Macron demanded EU sanctions against Türkiye’s policy in Greek and Cypriot waters. “I stand fully behind Cyprus and Greece in the face of the Turkish violations of their sovereignty,” said Macron.[45]

Accordingly, France has signed an agreement with Southern Cyprus to service French warships at Marie, the Cypriot naval base.[46] The French President ordered French forces in the eastern Mediterranean to provide military assistance to Greece. France, for the first time, deployed Rafale fighters to help carry out military patrols in the Cypriot exclusive economic zone under a military cooperation agreement.[47]

Meanwhile, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has appealed for de-escalation of tension in the eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Türkiye, warning that it could lead to a disaster. “The two countries are still open to dialogue despite their disagreements,” said Germany’s Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas.[48]

Finally, the European Union’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was placed firmly against Turkish interests and rights in its exclusive economic waters due to the convergence of French and Italian (and somewhat German) policies in support of Greece and Greek Cyprus.[49]

5.2 Refugees 

Türkiye has witnessed an unprecedented influx of refugees from Syria and other countries— more than 3.7 million as of the date of writing this study.[50] The fact that Türkiye has formed a bridge for many refugees to cross into the European Union pushed the latter to draw up a joint action plan, which was activated at the EU-Türkiye Summit on November 29, 2015. The plan aimed at preventing irregular migration flows to the EU.

In their joint statement of 18 March 2016, the EU and Türkiye have committed to ending irregular migration from Türkiye to Europe, breaking smugglers’ business model, and offering migrants an alternative to risking their lives by heading to Europe.[51]

The future of refugees, mainly Syrians, has been the subject of a constant dialogue between the European Union and Türkiye for more than four years, during which the European Union agreed to pay 6 billion euros to the Turkish government to support Syrian refugees. 

However, Türkiye is constantly calling for greater support for embracing refugees in terms of integration, financial, and educational support. Admittedly, some European political parties have expressed that Türkiye should not bear the burden alone, and the financial measures included in the Refugee Support Fund should be expanded.

5.3 Economic Relations

Türkiye and the European Union have a set of mutually beneficial economic interests. There is also a customs union that allows free movement of goods between the parties.

The European Union is Türkiye’s first trading partner and source of investments, while Türkiye ranks as the fifth largest trading partner of the European Union. In numbers, the EU market constitutes 42.4% of the total Turkish exports, while Türkiye’s total imports from the EU reached 32.3%.[52]

As shown in Table (2), Türkiye’s imports decreased by 1.3% in 2019 compared to the previous year, and the proportion of European imports from Türkiye amounted to 4.4% compared to 2018. This is due to the adoption and development of Turkish industries and the production of many goods that Türkiye previously imported.[53]

5.4 Counter-Terrorism

Despite the differences in the priorities of the two sides, counterterrorism cooperation between Türkiye and the European Union will remain a priority. The most critical security concern that has preoccupied both sides in the past five years is the issue of hundreds of ISIS jihadists and their families detained by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units. 

Some of the jihadists were arrested by the Turkish authorities on the Syrian-Turkish border, and it turned out that they held European passports. The rest, who are still in Syria, are likely to return to their countries in the European Union via Türkiye. This threat has imposed security cooperation between Türkiye and the European Union, which serves the interests of both parties, and prevents any terrorist acts.[54]

6. Turkish-Saudi Relations

The deteriorating relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia were highlighted by the events that occurred between 2015 and 2020. Some of these included the Qatar Crisis and the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul.

On March 13, 2015, the Turkish President expressed Türkiye’s readiness to support the Decisive Storm[55] alliance logistically in the military operation in Yemen against the Houthis.[56]

On April 14, 2016, the Turkish Foreign Minister and his Saudi counterpart signed an agreement to set up a “Strategic Coordination Council” to strengthen eight sectors, including agriculture, the army, culture, combating terrorism, in addition to diplomatic relations.[57]

Six months after the failed coup attempt in Türkiye in 2016, President Erdoğan toured the Gulf, starting with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.[58]

Then, in June 2017, there was a clear divergence between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia regarding the Qatar blockade.[59] Türkiye’s siding with Qatar and constructing a Turkish military base there provoked Saudi Arabia and negatively impacted the two countries’ relations.[60]

In 2020, things got worse with an “informal” Saudi boycott of Turkish goods. Many Saudi companies, encouraged by the government-linked Saudi Chamber of Commerce, rejected doing business with Türkiye.

On November 20, 2020, King Salman made a phone call with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to invite him to attend the G20 economic summit that was held in Saudi Arabia, and the two sides discussed how to improve the tense relations between the two countries.[61]

7. Turkish-Emirati Relations

The United Arab Emirates was previously ranked among Türkiye’s largest Arab trading partners and was a major source of foreign direct investment. According to statistics, Türkiye’s trade with the UAE decreased sharply after 2017—  by 66% in exports and 32% in imports in 2017.[62]

The Arab Spring revolutions indicate that Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates were at odds with one another. While the first supported the revolutions, the UAE was against them. Disagreements between the two parties intensified as Türkiye embraced figures affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which the UAE fought politically and in the media in several countries.

The contention expanded severely between the two countries during the Libyan Crisis. Türkiye stood by the internationally recognized Government of National Accord and supported it militarily and politically. In contrast, the UAE supported Khalifa Haftar’s forces militarily and financially. It is also to be mentioned that the Qatar Crisis and Türkiye’s stance exacerbated the situation. 

Moreover, the UAE also stood against Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean and organized military exercises with Greece.

Besides, Turkish media always indicate that the UAE played a role in the failed coup in 2016 and spent billions of dollars supporting the Kurdish People’s Protection Units in Syria.[63]

8. Turkish-Iranian Relations

Over the past years, Türkiye and Iran have managed to separate their economic relations from their regional rivalry, which has partially contributed to controlling the mutual policies between the two in order to protect their common economic interests.

To Türkiye, Iran is a strategic source of crude oil and natural gas supplies necessary for its energy security and diversification policy. Iran’s large population also makes it an important market for Türkiye’s exports.

Despite Iran’s criticism of Türkiye’s intervention in Iraq, it does not seem to have any objection when Türkiye carries out a military operation against Kurdish positions in the country.[64] Of course, Türkiye and Iran have a common concern about the independence of Kurdistan in northern Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state. [65]

The relationship between the two countries began to be tense with the beginning of the Syrian Revolution in 2015. Iran supported the Assad regime militarily and politically. On the other hand, Türkiye sided with the Syrian opposition. Considerably, each side sought to undermine and condemn the other party’s policy in Syria.[66]

Then, a rapprochement occurred between the two countries after Iran opposed the failed military coup attempt in Türkiye in 2016. Türkiye also criticized the protests in Iran in 2018 and opposed the US sanctions imposed on Iran in the same year.[67]

As a result, cooperation between the two parties increased despite their differences in the Syrian file. In 2017, the Turks met with the Iranians, along with the Russians, in the tripartite meeting in Sochi and then in Astana to sponsor the negotiations between the Syrian opposition and the regime.

9. Turkish-Egyptian Relations

Tensions between Türkiye and Egypt grew after the military coup carried out by current President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi against the elected government in 2013. Despite the tension between the two countries, their diplomatic relations were maintained at the level of Chargés d’affaires.[68]

The two countries enjoy strong economic ties as Egypt is Türkiye’s main trading partner in Africa. Surprisingly, the value of trade exchange between the two parties recorded an increase from 2015 to 2019, despite the political crisis.[69]

Table No. (3): Turkish-Egyptian Exports and Imports between 2015 – 2019

Tensions increased between the two countries after Türkiye signed a maritime boundary treaty with Libya in 2019. In response, the Egyptian government rejected and signed a counter-treaty with Greece demarcating their water borders.

Tensions rose after Türkiye militarily intervened on the side of the Government of National Accord against Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by Egypt. Unquestionably, the Turkish military’s support turned the tide of the war in favor of the GNA. 

Signs of improved relations began in early 2021 after Türkiye issued instructions to TV channels run by the Egyptian opposition in Istanbul to mitigate its criticism of the Sisi regime. In early May 2021, a Turkish delegation visited Cairo, which gave fresh impetus to the relations between the two.[70]

The return of Turkish-Egyptian relations can be explained by the international transformations, especially in the Middle East. These transformations may result in the American withdrawal from the region, which could leave behind a security vacuum that may be interspersed with the spread of cross-border militias that threaten the countries’ safety. 

10. Turkish-Libyan Relations

The former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s visit to Libya in 1979 marked the beginning of the Turkish-Libyan relations. During the time of Muammar Gaddafi, the two countries signed a number of economic agreements in various fields. 

More trade agreements to enhance trade exchange were signed in 1987 when former Turkish Prime Minister Kenan Evren visited Libya. Relations between the two countries continued to develop, reaching the highest levels in the late 1990s. 

In 2010, The trade exchange amounted to 9.8 billion dollars, and Libya announced that it would grant Türkiye investments of $100 billion.[71]

Türkiye announced its official position supporting mobility and demands for political change iهn the revolution against Gaddafi. After the fall of that regime, the spread of internal chaos, and the militias, Türkiye sided with the legitimate and UN-recognized Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli, against the mutinous Major General Khalifa Haftar.

Based on the Blue Homeland doctrine, Türkiye and the Government of National Accord signed in 2019 the Treaty on the Demarcation of Water Boundaries (Exclusive Economic Zone) in the Eastern Mediterranean. (For more information, see our study on how Türkiye changed in five years, foreign military bases and interventions.)[72]

In 2019, Türkiye intervened militarily in Libya after Haftar’s forces, backed by several international parties, carried out military operations against the Government of National Accord to control Tripoli, the capital, and overthrow the government.

However, the contribution of the Turkish naval and ground forces, backed by drones, enabled the GNA to repel the attacks of Haftar’s forces and regain control of many cities and regions located on the western coastline, in addition to regaining control of many strategic military bases in Libya.[73]

After the formation of a National Unity Government in Libya in 2021, Türkiye maintained its political and economic interests and signed several trade agreements in different fields. 

11.  A comparison of the Course of Turkish Foreign Relations before and after 2015

12. Conclusion 

The Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant change in the last five years due to the adoption of the Blue Homeland, the Zero-problems, and Peace at Home, Peace in the world doctrines.

Internationally, there was a dispute over some cases between Türkiye and the United States, especially regarding purchasing the S-400 missiles and Türkiye’s rapprochement with Russia. The differences were somewhat severe, yet Türkiye maintained strategic relations with America.

Türkiye’s relations with the EU were fluctuating and had several differences regarding the delimitation of the water boundary in the eastern Mediterranean, the Libyan crisis, and the refugees’ issue. However, the economic relations were preserved as trade and technology transfer play important roles in both directions.  

Despite the severe differences, Türkiye maintains its strategic alliance with the EU and U.S. under the umbrella of NATO, an alliance that is considered one of the constants in its foreign policy.

Notwithstanding their historical enmity, Türkiye and Russia have managed to achieve high trade exchange and reach an agreement on various regional issues. They have also coordinated in many cases, such as Syria, Azerbaijan, Libya, and the Black Sea. However, the competition over the control of the Black Sea is threatening the stability of the foreign policy relationships of Türkiye and Russia, making it hard to reach a stage of a strategic relationship.

Regionally, Turkish relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE became tense after Türkiye stood by Qatar in the blockade imposed on it, and to a greater extent with the UAE due to the dispute over several other cases, resulting in a decline in the mutual economic relations between them.

After a phase of competition for influence in Syria, Türkiye moved to coordinate with Iran, following several developments inside Syria

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13. Study Appendix 

In this appendix, we summarize the Turkish foreign relations with some countries as follows: 

13.1 Turkish-Chinese Relations

Türkiye’s relationship with China is based on the “zero problems” strategy that confirms the multidimensional foreign policy and openness to the East in a way that achieves balance and guarantees the Turkish interests. Therefore, Türkiye sought to strengthen mutual relations with China, as it is the most important economic and military country in the East and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. [74]

Although there is no strategic dispute or disagreement over interests of great political importance between the two countries, Turkish-Chinese relations were strained due to the Chinese government’s violations of human rights against the Muslim Uyghur Turks residing in eastern China. 

In 2018, Human Rights Watch submitted a report detailing the Chinese government’s campaign of “mass arbitrary detention, torture, forced political indoctrination, and mass surveillance of Muslims in Xinjiang in eastern China.”[75] In its turn, Türkiye stood against these acts and received a large number of Uyghurs on its lands.

Following several official visits in 2010, the relationship between Türkiye and China was upgraded to the level of strategic cooperation. The bilateral economic and political relations became more advantageous after China put forward the Belt and Road Initiative (Silk Road) that was signed by President Xi Jinping in 2015.[76]

 (For more information, see our study on the following link: http://ayam.com.tr/ar/دراسات/مبادرة-الصين-للحزام-والطريق-الواحد-2/ ) 

Economically, the trade volume between China and Türkiye amounted to about 24 billion dollars in 2020. During the last five years, the increase in Turkish exports to China led to a 7% decrease in the country’s foreign trade deficit, which was in favor of China. Moreover, major Chinese smartphone manufacturers such as Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo have made direct investments in Türkiye.[77]

President Erdogan’s four official visits to China in 2012, 2015, 2017, and 2019 are clear evidence of its political and economic importance and the need to strengthen ties with it at all levels.

13.2 Turkish-Malaysian Relations

In 1996, former Turkish Prime Minister Necmetttin Erbakan visited Malaysia. During his stay, he concluded several agreements in the defense industry and economic and cultural relations. 

Malaysia’s importance to Türkiye stems from being a country with advanced economic development, in addition to being Türkiye’s gateway to Southeast Asia. From this point of view, President Erdoğan (then Prime Minister) visited it in 2003, and relations reached their peak in all fields, as evidenced by the increase in economic exchanges between the two countries from $396 million to $1 billion.[78]

Between 2011-2014, the two countries exchanged official visits at the level of the Prime Minister, represented by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and then Malaysian Najib Rizk. These visits marked a new era in economic relations between the two countries and the signing of the Free Trade Agreement, which helped to promote investment and trade exchange.[79] Indeed, the trade volume between the two states increased in 2014 to $2 billion, and it reached $3.4 billion in 2017, with an aim to increase it to at least $5 billion in the future.[80]

Malaysia backed Türkiye after the July 15 failed coup attempt. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak declared that he stands by the Turkish government against the outlawed attempt to destroy democracy. In 2017, three high-ranking FETO members were arrested in Malaysia and handed over to Türkiye, boosting signs of friendship between the two countries.[81]

On July 27, 2019, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad paid an official visit to Türkiye. On December 19, 2019, President Erdoğan visited Malaysia within the framework of the Kuala Lumpur Summit. He signed fourteen Memorandum of Understanding that stipulate bilateral cooperation between companies operating in the defense industry.[82]

13.3 Turkish-Japanese Relations

Diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Japan date back to 1924, with two major historical events marking the foundation stone of their friendship. 

 1- The visit of the Ottoman Empire’s Ertugrul Frigate to Japan in 1890: 

The ship was carrying gifts and a message of friendship from Sultan Abdul Hamid II to the then Japanese Emperor Meiji, but a disaster occurred when the Frigate sank off the Japanese coast in 1890, resulting in the death of 532 sailors. 

The Japanese people showed a lot of sympathy to the families of the stricken crew, sent aid to them, and commemorated their memory annually. This was confirmed by former Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in his meeting with the grandchildren of the Ertuğrul martyrs during his visit to Türkiye in May 2013.[83]

2- Turkish Rescue of Japanese Citizens from Tehran

Turkish Airlines rescued a number of Japanese who were trapped in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in 1985 and evacuated them to Japan.[84]

During his visit in 2013, former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that bilateral relations had risen to the level of a strategic partnership. 

Japanese companies have participated in several huge projects in Türkiye, including the third bridge project in Istanbul, the metro project, and the Başakşehir Çam and Sakura Medical City project.

13.4 Turkish-Afghan Relations

Beginning with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the opening of a representative office for Türkiye in Kabul, Türkiye’s relationship with Afghanistan is one of the oldest foreign relations. The Turkish-Afghan Alliance Agreement was concluded in 1921. 

Moreover, Afghanistan is the second country to recognize the Turkish Republic, and the Turkish Embassy in Afghanistan is the first diplomatic mission opened in Kabul. 

By sending a large number of experts in various fields between 1920-1960, Türkiye played a role in developing Afghan state institutions in the military, cultural, education, and health sectors.[85]

During the American occupation of Afghanistan, Türkiye’s contribution was limited to supporting the efforts of the United Nations and NATO to protect Karzai International Airport in the capital, Kabul, and training some army officers.[86]

Within the framework of a conference held in Brussels to collect aid in 2004, Türkiye assisted Afghanistan with nearly 1.1 billion dollars, which is among the largest foreign aid programs Türkiye has ever offered to a foreign country.[87]

On October 18, 2014, Turkish President Erdoğan visited Afghanistan— the first president to visit in 46 years. During the visit, a strategic partnership and friendship agreement was signed between the two countries. Later, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made an official visit to Türkiye in 2015 at the invitation of President Erdogan.

In addition, Minister Çavuşoğlu visited Kabul on June 16, 2016, and held meetings with President Ghani. Also, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim visited Afghanistan on April 8, 2018, and met President Ashraf Ghani and then Chairman of the Executive Committee Abdullah Abdullah.

The Turkish forces stationed at Karzai Airport left after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces on August 31, 2021, which resulted in the collapse of the government in Kabul and the Taliban’s control of the country.[88]

With the absence of international recognition of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan until writing this study, the relationship between the two countries remains unidentified.

13.5 Turkish Relations with the Maghreb Countries

Türkiye has historical relations with the countries of the Maghreb (the Kingdom of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania) that extend back to the period of the Ottoman Empire.   

The Kingdom of Morocco

Although the Ottomans did not take control of lands in Morocco, they still maintained diplomatic relations with the Kingdom. They also participated in wars against Portugal and Spain.

To strengthen the political and economic relations with the Kingdom, Türkiye had a clear position concerning the Sahara conflict and supported the territorial integrity of Morocco.[89]

The signing of the Free Trade Agreement in 2006 increased the value of trade exchanges between the two countries, reaching $2.8 billion in 2018. 

In 2013, Türkiye’s Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Morocco and signed the agreement for the establishment of the High-level Strategic Cooperation Council (YDSK). 

The number of Turkish businesses operating in Morocco has increased significantly in the last few years and reached 160. They mainly work in contracting, construction, wholesale and retail trade, textiles, furniture, iron and steel, carpets, foodstuffs, and ready-made garments. Türkiye has undertaken various projects in Morocco worth over $4.1 billion; nearly 8000 Moroccans are employed in these investments.[90]

Algeria

Algeria’s association with the socialist system prevented the development of Turkish-Algerian relations, given that Türkiye was part of NATO and the Western system. However, the obstacles that once hindered the strengthening of ties largely disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Respectively, the mutual visits of high-level delegations increased, the “Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation” was signed in 2006, and Türkiye became Algeria’s strategic partner along with Spain, Italy, and Portugal.

In 2018, President Erdoğan visited Algeria and signed seven agreements, two of which were trade deals.

Notably, Algeria ranks as Türkiye’s fourth natural gas supplier and is considered important in promoting Türkiye’s resource diversification policy.[91]

In terms of developing Turkish investments, Algeria enjoys a large geographical area and a population of more than 40 million people. It is also the fourth-largest economy in the African continent.[92]

During the meeting, Dr. Mustafa AL-WAHAIB gave a lecture on Think Tanks’ importance and methodologies. Also, a discussion took place on the paths of research work with Mr. Recep Songül, Editor-in-Chief (AYAM), and Dr. Omar Zaidan, Coordinator of Iraqi Affairs (AYAM).

The following are the expected crises that will affect the global economy in the winter of 2021-2022— these are mainly related to the resources crisis and climate change.

1. A Bitterly Cold Winter

Climate change has a significant impact on people’s lives and countries’ economies. For example, there is a correlation between the decrease in temperature and the rise in the cost of daily life; the high demand for heating resources (oil, gas, and coal) necessarily increases their prices, which is also reflected in other goods and services costs.

The U.S. National Snow Center, NASA, and many meteorological centers predict a cold winter and lower temperatures than usual. According to weather agencies, the Polar Vortex, a large region of cold, rotating air that encircles the Earth’s polar regions, is the most important factor in predicting the weather. Although the Arctic air is well contained, the belt may become weak, causing the air to flow, which will lead to a rapid and extreme drop in temperature. As expected, the continents most affected by the polar vortex’s disruption are Asia, Europe, and North America.

Moreover, NASA has predicted cold weather in several regions of the world, especially in the northern hemisphere. After an expedition to the North Pole, The NASA mission confirmed that a major disturbance in the polar vortex is almost inevitable this winter.

2. A Rise in the Energy Resources’ Prices

The decline in oil and gas prices during the outbreak of the Corona pandemic prompted the major oil-producing countries, the OPEC+ alliance, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, to hold a monthly meeting at the level of oil ministers to discuss measures to maintain the stability of the global oil market. Those measures included the reduction of production in proportion to the global economic recession to maintain the oil barrel prices from collapsing.

With the majority of world countries lifting the preventive measures and the OPEC+ alliance maintaining the policy of reducing production and the gradual increase in it, the prices of a barrel of oil rose in the fourth quarter of 2021, reaching 80 dollars per barrel, after it was stable between 60-65 dollars.

In a related context, the natural gas prices recorded $34 per million British thermal units at the beginning of the outbreak of the Corona pandemic. Now, however, gas prices have risen nearly 500% due to the following main reasons: 

• The predictions of cold winter that will affect consumers who use it for heating, factories, companies, and electricity production
• The low storage levels in European countries resulted from a decrease in Russian supplies and the interruption of one of the pipelines from Algeria through Moroccan territory
• The recovery of global economies from the Corona pandemic that led to increased gas demand
• The dependence of many countries on natural gas as an environmentally friendly fuel because it emits less carbon dioxide than oil and coal
• The increased demand for electricity

3. High Sea Freight Costs 

There are many factors that contribute to the high prices for international shipping, such as piracy, security tensions, and political conflicts between countries that can affect the operation of ships.

During the Corona pandemic, shipping costs have increased worldwide due to the container crisis, the decreased movement of global supply chains, and the strikes that affected international ports, especially in China and America. To illustrate, the majority of the Chinese shipping containers remained in the U.S during the pandemic. With the global demand recovery, a crisis emerged as those containers were not available in China when needed, which added more expense to the shipping prices.  

Conclusion

The points discussed above portend an increase in prices of all commodities and living costs in many countries.

Obviously, the leading nations of the OPEC+ alliance (Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Qatar) will get huge financial revenues from the energy resources they produce.

In response to the rising demand for natural gas, many countries, especially Europeans, may reconsider producing coal to operate their power plants to cover gas shortages.

This series of studies review the remarkable developments in Turkey’s international, regional, and internal status over the last five years (2015-2020) that witnessed qualitative and fundamental changes, including the failed coup in 2016, the restructuring of the Turkish State, the referendum, and transforming the government into the Presidential System. 

There were also many international and regional changes— most notably, Donald Trump becoming the United States President and the changes in the States Administration’s priorities after Joe Biden took over. It is equally important to mention the effective direction of Turkey’s foreign policy towards international issues such as Syria and Libya and its increasing role in Africa and Central Asia.

Finally, the economic, social, and political changes imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Our studies cover Turkey’s energy, military industrialization, foreign relations, internal status, economy, external military interventions, and military bases beyond national borders.

As Turkey faces many challenges while moving forward, we hope to shed light on the facts of Turkey’s current regional and international position compared to five years ago.

Dr. Mustafa Al-Wahib
Director of Anadolu Center for Near East Studies 

1. Introduction

With a relentless pursuit to restore the regional balance, Turkey’s foreign policy was redirected towards military operations beyond its borders and the establishment of foreign military bases in countries like Libya, Qatar, and Syria. The new policy can be attributed to Turkey’s strategic development in military industrialization in the past five years.

Led by the AK Party, the Turkish government adopted the “zero problems with neighbors” doctrine till 2014. Later, the foreign policy embraced “the Blue Homeland or Mavi Vatan” concept, a new framework that established the basis for Turkey’s recent foreign diplomatic and military movements.

There are other important drivers of Turkey’s foreign policy’s changes, including the government’s transformation into the Presidential System after the failed coup in 2016 and the deterioration of relationships with the West due to fundamental disagreements that endangered Turkey’s interests.

2. Turkish military Interventions Beyond the Border before 2015

The principle of zero problems with neighbors had been the core of Turkey’s foreign policy vision until 2015. As a result, Turkey has not engaged in any military operation individually— except its intervention in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1974.

Notwithstanding the above, Turkey participated in several military operations as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the International Peacekeeping Forces:

It is to be noted that Turkey maintained permanent military posts in Northern Iraq through a mutual agreement with the Iraqi government in the 1980s. Accordingly, the Turkish army has carried out several military operations against PKK bases in Iraq since the 1990s. 

3. Drivers of Turkish Military Interventions after 2015

The transformation in Turkey’s military and defense strategy, which secures the state’s political and economic interests, led to Turkey’s individual military intervention (not supported by NATO) in many international arenas. 

This is a fundamental change in Turkey’s foreign policy that can also be attributed to the following drivers:

3.1. Countering Terrorism and Maintaining Border Security 

Turkey was forced to undertake external military interventions due to the undermining regional stability caused by the rapid proliferation of non-state armed groups in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis (Kurdish militias supported by the U.S and the EU and PKK militias in Northern Iraq), the NATO ceased alliance to counter the cross-border threats following the downing of the Russian Sukhoi aircraft, and the Patriot missile system withdrawal from the Southern Turkish border.

These challenges forced Turkey to be more assertive, and the military interventions against ISIS, PKK, and YPG started in Syria and Iraq in August 2015.

3.2. Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) Strategy

Blue Homeland is a geostrategic concept aiming to secure the Turkish geopolitical water rights on the high seas, i.e., the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Aegean Sea. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the strategy adoption in 2019.

Ever since, Anakara has developed its naval military industry and launched military exercises in its territorial waters, deploying its naval military forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and signing the “Delimitation of the Water Boundary” treaty with Libya.

3.3.  Strengthening the Regional Role

Due to its strategic location, inherent historical roots, and impact on the region, Turkey had to play a decent role that required its diplomatic and military contribution in regional developments to protect its interests and restore its deserved position.

3.4. Investing in Seaports

As a part of its strategy of external openness, Turkey has sought to invest in some strategic ports in Libya, Djibouti, and Somalia.

Turkey has recently signed a maritime cooperation agreement with Djibouti, one of the most important regional trade ports in the Horn of Africa. Concluded on February 19, 2020, the agreement sets out the legal basis for Turkish investments in Djibouti, such as port operation and management, international maritime transport, navigation services, and ship and yacht construction and training. 

According to Milliyet, the two sides also agreed on strengthening bilateral trade, developing their relations in the aviation, rail, and maritime sectors, and establishing a new free economic zone in Djibouti.

In Somalia, the Turkish firm Al-Bayrak has managed the Port of Mogadishu since 2014, with a privilege of 20 years of 45% of the port’s revenue. 

3.5. Economic Interests 

By establishing bases or deploying forces abroad, Turkey aims to achieve economic gains within a comprehensive framework of cooperation that opens new markets for Turkish exports, contributes directly to the public and private sector, and establishes free trade zones. 

• According to the Turkish Institute of Statistics, the bilateral trade between Turkey and Somalia increased from $144 million in 2017 to $206 million in 2019.

• Turkey has signed five agreements with the Libyan Government of National Accord, headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. The Ronesans Group, a Turkish holding company, signed a memorandum to build an international passenger terminal for Tripoli Airport, and Aksa Energi signed a contract to build power plants.

• Economic relations between Qatar and Turkey grew appreciably in many fields, with Turkish construction companies acquiring a large portion of the projects in Qatar and establishing a Turkish free trade zone. According to the Qatari reports, the value of Turkish imports has tripled in the last five years.

• The value of Turkey’s imports of gas and oil from Azerbaijan has increased, as shown in our previous study of how Turkey has changed over five years in energy security. In addition, The value of trade and investment between the two countries has also risen; check details in a previous study by the AYAM center.

3.6. Development of Turkish Military Industries

Turkish military industries have developed considerably after 2015. The ground defense system’s improvement turned Turkey into a leading nation in tank manufacturing. For example, ALTAY MBT and KAPLAN medium tanks are among the most competitive Turkish defense products in world markets. 

Turkey has also developed indigenous air defense systems, such as HİSAR-A, a low-altitude air defense missile system. Yet, the most notable development in Turkish military industries is the Drone; one of the best is Bayraktar, a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and armed attack missions.

Check details in a previous study by the AYAM center.

As a matter of fact, the efficiency of the Turkish weapons in the outside operations indicates Turkey’s military strength and competitiveness in the international military industries.

4. Turkish Military Bases, Interventions, and Treaties

The Turkish Armed Forces collectively rank as the second-largest standing military force in NATO. Consequently, TAFs have been involved in many outside operations within the NATO missions.

4.1. Military Bases

4.1.1 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Established in 1974 in Northern Cyprus, the military base is the oldest and largest Turkish base abroad. According to the Treaty of Guarantee (1960), Turkey is a guarantor power of Turkish Cypriots security. Moreover, Turkey views its military presence in Cyprus as necessary for its own security.

4.1.2 Qatar 

On April 28^th, 2014, a military cooperation treaty between the Qatari and Turkish Ministries of Defense established the Ar-Rayyan army base in Qatar— the first Turkish military base in The Arab Gulf. On June 7^th, 2017,  the Turkish parliament ratified a bilateral defense bill with Qatar.

94 Turkish military personnel have been stationed in the base since 2015. Then, the number increased to 200, and it is expected to reach 500-600 soldiers when the upgrade to a joint tactical division headquarters occurs.

The core mission of Turkish soldiers deployed in Qatar is to train the Qatari army. They can, however, intervene and contribute to the resolution of potential crises affecting the region.

Overall, allowing Turkish forces to be stationed on Qatari territory and to use Qatar’s airspace and all necessary infrastructure is considered the most important item in the defense cooperation agreement between the two states. However, Turkey is not legally committed to defending Qatar should it be attacked. 

It is anticipated that the U.S (Turkey’s NATO ally) will focus on confronting the rising power of China. The fact that the American National Security Strategic Plan seeks to withdraw part of its forces present in the Middle East and reduce those forces’ financial resources can confirm the assumption. Therefore, the Turkish base in Qatar may contribute to protecting the interests of its NATO allies in the Arab Gulf in the future.

4.1.3 Iraq

Bashiqa military base, located within the border between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraqi territory, was established to train the Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni Arab fighters to recapture Mosul from ISIS in 2015. 

Unlike Syria, Turkey does not control any territory in Iraq; however, the Iraqi central government called on Turkey to withdraw troops deployed in Bashiqa and suspend its operations in Iraq. 

Yet, Turkey insists that the military deployment is part of a bilateral agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Turkey, requested by the former Governor of Mosul. Thus, Turkey often sends its aircraft and troops across the border to northern Iraq to target PKK posts.

4.1.4 Somalia 

Turkey signed a military agreement with Somalia in December 2012, in which Turkey pledged to restructure the Somali army. In October 2017, the Anatolian Barracks, a Turkish military base, was opened in Mogadishu.

With an area of 4 km² and a construction cost of up to 50 million dollars, the Turkish base in Somalia is Turkey’s largest overseas military base.

The Anatolian Barracks has 200 personnel under the Turkish-Somali Task Force (STGK), and their main task is to protect the base and train the Somali army soldiers.

This agreement gave a strategic presence to Turkey on the Gulf of Aden (Bab al-Mandeb Strait), which is one of the global shipping joints and a strategic corridor, as shown in map 3.

Why does Turkey prioritize Somalia in its strategy towards the African States?

• Geostragically, Somalia’s northern coast borders the Gulf of Aden, leading to Bab el-Mandeb, which is one of the most important global trade corridors.

• Economically, Turkey is keen to protect its economic interests in Africa. In fact, the trade between Turkey and African countries reached $20 billion in 2015 and is set to reach $50 billion by 2023. Moreover, some reports confirm that there are large oil and natural gas reserves in Somalia.

• Militarily, Turkey has already signed security agreements with Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda to train their forces to fight against terrorism, expanding the Turkish military influence in the Horn of Africa.

• Commercially, Turkey is seeking to open new markets for its developed military industries.

4.2 Defense Cooperation

4.2.1 Albania 

A military cooperation agreement was signed in 1997 between Turkey and Albania. The deal included rebuilding Albania’s Pasha Liman Naval Base alongside granting access for Turkish use (24 Turkish soldiers are stationed in the base).

In February 2020, Albania and Turkey signed a defense cooperation plan to strengthen and intensify their interrelations in security and defense areas.

4.2.2 Azerbaijan

The agreement on strategic partnership and mutual support between Azerbaijan and Turkey was signed in 2010 and came into effect in 2011.

Under the second article of the agreement and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on self-defense, both Turkey and Azerbaijan will support each other “using all possibilities” in the case of a military attack or aggression against either of the countries.

Articles 7 and 8 endorse the coordination in military commands, armaments, infrastructure, and logistical support in joint military operations under article 2.

“Based on this Convention, Turkey intervened in Azerbaijan to support it in Nagorno-Karabakh, sending military advisers and experts to operate Turkish drones during the clashes.”

On November 17th, 2020, the Turkish Parliament mandated President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to deploy military forces to Azerbaijan amid Turkish-Russian differences over the details of the joint cease-fire monitoring post to be established in Azerbaijan away from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.

This one-year mandate authorizes the President to determine the time, extent, and size of military tasks in Azerbaijan.

4.2.3 Sudan

The establishment of a Turkish base in Sudan first came to light during the visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in December 2017 during the reign of Omar al-Bashir- the former President of Sudan. 

The two countries then signed an agreement whereby Turkey would renovate the facilities on the Red Sea island of Suakin at an estimated cost of $650 million. (See map 5)

Earlier in October 2018, the Sudanese government agreed to implement a military cooperation and training agreement between Sudan and Turkey- still valid till now. 

4.3. Military Operations

4.3.1. Syria

The political priorities of Turkey have shifted over the war in Syria. The primary intention was to overthrow the Assad regime; however, the proliferation of PYD/YPG militias redirected the Turkish government’s main objective: Turkey has sought to prevent the PYD/ YPG from creating an area of dominance on its southern border.

On the humanitarian side, Turkey has worked to reduce the influx of refugees and establish a safe zone in Northern Syria.

To achieve these objectives, Turkey, together with Syrian opposition forces, carried out four military operations to secure four areas under the control of Syrian opposition forces, summarized in table 3.

“Since the beginning of 2020, Turkey has concentrated on the western Euphrates, particularly Idlib, the last opposition stronghold in Syria and an important buffer between Turkey and the Syrian regime.”

“According to Turkish sources, by March 2020, up to 20,000 Turkish troops had been deployed to the area with more than ten military observation posts as shown in Map No. 2.”

4.3.2 Libya

In 2019, after Gaddafi was overthrown and the Libyan War broke out, Turkey intervened militarily in Libya.

Using armed drones and other military means to support the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), Turkey succeeded in repelling the Libyan National Army attack led by Khalifa Haftar. 

According to sources, Turkey was in talks with the Government of National Accord to establish two bases in Libya, one at Al-Watiya, the most important airbase in western Libya. Turkey has also announced potential energy and construction deals with Libya once the fighting is over.

Turkey’s maritime interests in the Eastern Mediterranean are the drive of its involvement in Libya. Therefore, it can be inferred that Turkey is attempting to reinforce its claims to the exclusive economic zone and the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

5. Turkish Forces Military Exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean has always been a maritime boundary conflict zone, in which drilling and exploration activities for gas and oil resources are taking place. In addition, it is a point of military naval maneuvers between groups of countries bordering it.

The tension between Turkey and Greece, Cyprus, and the European Union was exacerbated by Turkey’s extensive exploration and drilling in the disputed areas. (Check Map No. 4)

Consequently, Turkey has moved diplomatically and signed two conventions for maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean:

•  2011: Turkey signed the Convention on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey)

• 2019: Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones of the two States in the eastern Mediterranean (signed by the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the State of Libyan National Accord).

Turkey has actively sought to protect its water rights by sending its warships along with its search and exploration vessels and conducting several military exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean, leading to numerous wrangles between Turkey, Greece, and the European Union States, particularly France.

“Included in Turkey’s plan to maintain its water security within the strategy of the Blue Homeland, the Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the top priorities and concerns of Turkish policy.”

6. Summary of Turkish Military Operations and Bases before 2015 and in 2020

7. Conclusion 

Turkey has sought to reduce its dependence on arms imports from abroad, which has led to the development of its defense capabilities in the last five years, which in turn has made a difference in its outside operation in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Azerbaijan.

Based on this, Turkey has obtained greater freedom in its foreign movements militarily, established military bases beyond its national borders, such as Qatar and Somalia, deployed its forces to Libya and Syria, and provided equipment, training, and military advice to Azerbaijan, Sudan, and some opposition factions in Syria.

It is important to note that, before 2015, Turkey had no military bases abroad other than a number of its troops in some States as part of international missions with NATO or as part of international peacekeeping forces.

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42.  https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kore_Savaşı 
43.     https://www.bbc.com غاز البحر المتوسط: لماذا وصف أردوغان الاتفاقية المصرية اليونانية بأنها “لا قيمة لها”arabic
44. conflict-ridden-eastern-mediterranean-syrian-war-disputed-waters-hinder-solutions-for-hydrocarbon، dailysabah، https://www.dailysabah.com 

This series of studies review the remarkable developments in Turkey’s international, regional, and internal status over the last five years (2015-2020) that witnessed qualitative and fundamental changes, including the failed coup in 2016, the restructuring of the Turkish State, the referendum, and transforming the government into the Presidential System. 

There were also many international and regional changes— most notably, Donald Trump becoming the United States President and the changes in the States Administration’s priorities after Joe Biden took over. It is equally important to mention the effective direction of Turkey’s foreign policy towards international issues such as Syria and Libya and its increasing role in Africa and Central Asia.

Finally, the economic, social, and political changes imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Our studies cover Turkey’s energy, military industrialization, foreign relations, internal status, economy, external military interventions, and military bases beyond national borders.

As Turkey faces many challenges while moving forward, we hope to shed light on the facts of Turkey’s current regional and international position compared to five years ago.

Dr. Mustafa Al-Wahib
Director of Anadolu Center for Near East Studies 

1. Introduction

The Turkish defense industry experienced qualitative development and production growth by 2020 as the Turkish military industries got involved in air, sea, and land forces. As a result, the Turkish army’s defense capabilities have increased and expanded to be exported to many countries.

Another key point is that several Turkish companies entered the global competition list of high-quality defense industries, with seven arms manufacturers ranked among the top 100 worldwide (Defense News): 

• Aselsan, Turkey’s largest defense company, ranked 52nd globally, sales reached $2.172 billion. 
• TUSAŞ, also known as TAI, ranked 48th.
•  BMC, Roketsan, STM, FNSS, and Havels.com were also listed.

The companies succeeded because of their expertise in military defense systems (imaging, optoelectronic technologies) and other products developed through scientific research. 

Remarkably, Turkey is the 14th largest exporter of defense weapons in the world, accounting for 1% of total global exports, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

2. Statistics of Turkey’s Statistics of Turkey’s Military Industries Military Industries

According to the Defense Industry Corporation (SSB), Turkey has the technology to manufacture and sell defense and attack weapons that are compatible with NATO standards and cheaper than its international competitors. Therefore, Turkish arms exports— specifically armored vehicles, ships, and sea boats— increased significantly between 2013 and 2019 and are expected to grow more in the future.

“Turkish defense sector exports rose by 34.6% in 2019 compared to 2018,” according to the Defense Exporters Association (SSI) and the Turkish Statistics Agency (TIM).

Turkey exported its military products to 164 countries in 2019, and the largest share of exports was received by The United States, followed by European Union and Middle Eastern countries. 

A significant increase in many related aspects, including the value of orders in the manufacturing process, the spending for the industry development, and the contribution of arms exports to the Turkish economy, is also noted.

Turkey’s share of arms imports decreased by 45% from 2015 to 2019 (see table 1). In general, Turkey’s import of military equipment decreased from 70% to only 30%, according to the latest statistics.

Facts:

• Defense and aviation sales reached $11 billion in 2020.
• Turkish defense companies also increased in number (56 in 2002 to 1,500 in 2020).
• The workforce reached around 75.000. 
• There were 700 implemented defense projects in 2020 and 350 new projects launched between 2015 and 2020.
• Turkish defense projects’ budget was $5.5 billion in 2002, while it reached $60 billion in 2020─ almost 11 times higher than in 2002.

According to TIM (Turkish Statistics Agency), the top 10 importers of Turkish arms (starting from 29 February 2020) are: United States ($131,257 million), Germany ($38,229 million), United Arab Emirates ($26,091 million), India ($23,984 million), Netherlands ($16,305 million), Qatar ($12,728 million), Switzerland ($12,062 million), Saudi Arabia ($ 11,354 million), the United Kingdom ($ 8,653 million) and Azerbaijan ($ 8,364 million).

In 2019, platforms and ground systems received the largest share of public expenditure and exports, followed by the aviation sectors (military and civil) in second place. (See Table 2)

In the 2019-2023 strategic plan, published in December 2019, the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) indicated that the annual sales volume of the Turkish defense and space industry is set to rise to $26.9 billion, and local industries reliance has to reach 75% by the end of 2023 – an increase of 10% compared to 2018. 

According to the Turkish Military Corporation, the export’s focus will be particularly on the Middle East, the Pacific, South and Central Asia, North Africa, and South America.

3. The Factors of recent Turkish Developments in Arms Manufacturers

The Turkish defense industry’s objectives were set in the Development Plan for the years (2014-2018):

• To create and support a competitive infrastructure in specific areas of the defense industry.
• To promote Turkey’s defense system to meet domestic demands in an integrated and sustainable manner.
• To increase research and development activities.

Efforts to build the defense industry in Turkey started in the 1970s, especially when the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1974 against the backdrop of the Cyprus crisis. 

Having relied almost completely on NATO to support its army, Turkey found itself in a precarious situation. As a result, the Turkish government decided to build and develop Turkish domestic military manufacturing capabilities to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers and meet the needs of the armed forces locally.

Recently, Turkey has witnessed developments and a qualitative shift in the defense industry, with four contributing factors:

1- The coup attempt on 15 July 2016 that led to a comprehensive restructure as the defense industry was first attached to the Turkish presidency then restructured as the “Presidency of the Defense Industry.”

2- The expansion of anti-threat operations beyond Turkey’s borders. Since August 2016, Turkey has carried out several military operations abroad, particularly in Syria and Iraq, including three major operations against ISIS and the PKK / PYD in Syria. However, Some Western countries opposed Turkey’s recent Peace Spring Operation in northern Syria, prompting some of them to suspend the supply of arms, or parts used in military industries, to Turkey.

3- Recent regional events and the resulting instability, such as developments in the Mediterranean and in Arab and regional states such as Syria, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Libya, as well as NATO’s withdrawal from supporting Turkey in threats it faces, particularly during the period of Turkey’s downing of a Russian Sukhoi aircraft on the Turkish-Syrian border.

4- Turkey’s realization that it cannot be a regional force without a deterrent military force. Moreover, the Turkish government may have considered that developing a national industrial base could help build the foundations for a more independent foreign policy.

Overall, an advanced defense industrial base can reach a regional power status by supplying the state with domestic arms on the one hand and arms exports that form a broader political and military cooperation on the other hand.

Over the past decade, Turkey has spent billions of dollars developing its defense sector to enhance its self-sufficiency to counter any possible embargo on its arms imports. Today, the Turkish domestic defense industry covers 70% of the state’s military needs, compared to 45% five years ago.

According to SSB, the military industry invested $60 billion in defense projects which led to Turkey’s arms industry development. By 2053, the state aims to make the Turkish defense industry 100% independent and boost its export capacity to reach $50 billion.

Moreover, the Government has adopted new regulatory measures. According to President Erdogan, the Military Industries Corporation has been placed within the institutions of the Turkish Presidency Office to improve its potential, allocate resources, and increase its efficiency. The Government has also consistently entrusted the diplomatic corps with marketing Turkish military equipment abroad and creating new markets for its defense exports.

4. Major Turkish Military Industries Companies

Turkey had one company listed in the top 100 world defense companies list in 2010. Still, with six more added to the list, Turkish companies have outnumbered Israel, Japan, Russia, and Sweden’s companies on the same list.

4.1 TEI

Turkish Aircraft Industries Corporation (TUSAS) was established in 1973 under the Turkish Ministry of Industry and Technology auspices to reduce foreign dependency. As part of a 2005 restructuring, TAI and TUSAS merged to form Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), and according to Defense News, TAI is the world’s 72nd biggest arms producer.

TAI works on fixed and rotary aircraft, drones, and military satellites. It was also an essential partner in the F- 35 manufacturing program and the aircraft’s center fuselage production. Furthermore, the company has operated one of the engine maintenance facilities for the F- 35.

Important programs run by the company:

• GOKTURK- 2 (Turkey’s first military intelligence satellite)
• T- 129 ATAK attack helicopter (in cooperation with Agusta Westland)
• Hurkus training aircraft (the first fully developed aircraft in Turkey)
• ANKA drone

4.2 Aselsan

Aselsan was established in 1975 to produce communications equipment, and according to Defense News, it is one of the largest arms companies in Turkey and ranks 58th worldwide. 

• In 1980, the first Manpack and Tank Tank wireless radios were delivered to the Turkish Armed Force.
• In 1983, the first export was realized. 
• Later, Aselsan produced the Stinger and F-16 Missiles.
• In the early 1990s, the Radars and Electro-Optical Systems were included in the Aselsan product range.
• In 1990, Aselsan products were integrated into all weapons systems of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Aselsan is a major provider of avionics and naval and weapon systems, including the fifth-generation fighters. 

Some of the company’s products:

• Altay Main Battle Tank
• Tulpar Infantry Fighting Vehicle
• ANKA Middle Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle
• T129 ATAK
• SOM cruise missiles
• MILGEM corvette

4.3 Roketsan

To establish the nation’s industrial base on missile technology, Roketsan was founded in 1988. The first project was producing the Stinger Missiles System under the European Common Stinger Production Project. It has since developed a range of other munitions for the Turkish Armed Forces.

Some of the company’s products:

• TR-107 Rocket with a range of 11 km and TR-122 Rocket with a range of 40 km
• Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) System
• OMTAS and UMTAS anti-tank missiles

4.4 STM

Ranked 85th on Defense News Top 100, STM works to develop and find innovative and intelligent technological solutions in marine vessels. Recently, STM has been developing kamikaze drones and innovative satellite technologies.

4.5 Havelsan

The company develops software and flight simulators to train pilots on next-generation air platforms.

4.6 Baykar Defense

The company produced the TB- 2 combat drone that is used on both national and international missions.

4.7 BMC

Ranked 85 for the first time in 2019, BMC is one of the major armored vehicle manufacturers in the Turkish defense industry.

5. Major Developments in the Turkish Military Industry between 2014-2020

The mentioned companies supply arms to the Turkish Armed Forces and are active players in the international arms market, which is essential for the future of the Turkish defense industry.

5.1 Major Developments in Aviation and Air Defense

1.  Bayraktar TB2 

Developed and manufactured indigenously by Baykar, Bayraktar is a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and armed attack missions.

Facts:

• Currently, 86 Bayraktar aircraft serve Turkey. 
• Bayraktar TB2 holds a record for endurance (27 hours 3 minutes) and altitude (27.030 feet). 
• Bayraktar TB2 is the first-ever aircraft in its category to be exported abroad.
• Bayraktar TB2 is used in Turkish military operations in Syria and Libya.
• Bayraktar TB2 is successfully used by Azerbaijani forces in their recent battle against Armenia in the Karabakh region.

2. ANKA-S

ANKA-S, produced by TIA, is one of the most important projects of the Turkish defense industry as it added strategic force to the Air Force Command.

Facts:

• The aircraft is controlled by satellites.
• Transmitting encrypted data in all communications systems represents ANKA-S’s powerful information security.
• ANKA-S is equipped for all difficult operational conditions.
• ANAKA-S is programmed to land on emergency bases in case of connection loss.
• The ANKA-S System is developed for day and night reconnaissance, surveillance, fixed/mobile target detection, detection, identification, tracking, and real-time image intelligence tasks, including those under unfavorable weather conditions.

3. Aksungur UAV

The Aksungur UAV, produced by the Turkish Aerospace Industry Company (TAI), has advanced capabilities. It became the first Turkish UAV to carry 227 kg of munitions and an 89 kg warhead, fired using laser guidance, in addition to the MK- 81 and MK- 82 bomb load.

4. HİSAR-A  

HİSAR-A, a low-altitude air defense missile system, is an air defense missile used against fighter aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and aerial vehicles to protect military bases, ports, and facilities from air threats.

Recent Development in Aviation and Air Defence Sector:

• ROKETSAN has announced that it had developed TRG-230 missiles with a range of 70 kilometers, a precise version of the 230-millimeter (9-inch) TR-230 missile, which is guided using GPS/INS navigation and can be launched from ROKETSAN’s Tiger Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher.
• On August 30, ROKETSAN released recordings and information on the test of a new version of the 230-millimeter-caliber missile, the TRLG-230, which can hit moving targets from the ground, increasing its precision by recognizing UCAVS.
• ASELSAN has developed the Karakulak High-Frequency Positioning and Intelligence System, and it was put into the Turkish Armed Forces service.
• ROKETSAN has developed the first probe and Turkish engine to cross space boundaries.
• In 2020, Turkey developed indigenous aviation engines, delivering the first TEI-TS1400 helicopter’s engine and producing the first turbo diesel engine for the TEI-PD 170, used in aircraft by TAI.
• At the same time, the first P- 72 naval patrol aircraft in the MELTEM- 3 projects was handed over to the Navy Command.

5.2 Major Developments in Naval Industry 

1. TCG Bayraktar

The TCG Bayraktar, one of the largest warships in Turkey, is a fully Turkish engineering product that took three years to design and was built by the Turkish Shipyard Foundation. It was delivered to the Naval Forces Command in 2017.

Features: 

• Advanced loading and unloading techniques for amphibious tanks
• Many sensors and anti-submarine systems against any possible air or land threats 
• A helicopter platform that allows the landing and take-off of a 15-ton helicopter for loading and unloading purposes 
• 4 LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel), each capable of carrying 8 tons of cargo or 40 people
• High endurance capabilities of staying 30 days at sea and traveling more than 5,000 nautical miles without refueling.
• Full personnel protection for nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks because of the upper steel building that is ballistic protected

2. TCG Anadolu LHD

The ship is one of the most prominent Turkish naval military industries.  It is now in production and scheduled to be delivered to the Naval Forces Command in 2021.

Features:

• 68% of the parts used in ship production are indigenous.
• Multi-Purpose
• A helicopter platform 
• Defense systems and electronic attack monitoring sensors
• Naval Operations Command Headquarter

3. The Military Floating Dock

With a lifting capacity of 10,000 tons, the floating dock is used by Turkish Naval Forces for all ships and platforms.

Features:

• 175.60 meters long
• 35.54 meters inner wide
• 2 electro-hydraulic type mobile cranes for loading and unloading

4. ORUÇ REİS

Constructed by Istanbul Deni̇zci̇li̇k Gemi̇ İnşa Sanayi̇ ve Ti̇caret A.Ş, ORUÇ REİS is the first seismic research ship that is nationally produced.

Tasks:

• Scientific studies of deep-sea pollution rates
• Seafloor scan
• Fiber-optic communication cables installation
• Oil and gas research in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.
• Pipelines construction

5. MOSHIP 4000

Constructed by Istanbul Maritime Shipbuilding Industry and Trade Inc. and the Turkish Naval Forces Command, MOSHIP 4000 is a specialized submarine rescue master ship designed to perform surface and underwater rescue operations and fire fighting in various sea conditions.

6. Barbaros Sınıfı Fırkateynlerimiz

It is a medium-sized, fast-moving vessel for defense operations, reconnaissance, and effective surveillance, designed by the Istanbul Maritime Shipbuilding and Trading Company.

5.3 Developments in Land Warfare Systems

Turkey has become the world’s destination when it comes to armored vehicles. Turkey’s defense industry has specialized in armor tank production to deal with threats such as explosive devices and to carry out ground incursions.

Armored vehicles— manufactured by private national companies like FNSS, Otokar, BMC, and Nurol Makina— are exported to many countries worldwide, with ALTAY MBT and KAPLAN main battle tanks as the most prestigious in international markets.

5.4 Developments in Ammunition Industry:

On April 29, 2021, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey will no longer be dependent on imported aerial bombs, ammunition, missiles, or warheads as the state has reached self-sufficiency.

Turkish Mechanical and Chemical Industries (MKEK) has developed the manufacture of military munitions of all types, shapes, and sizes and will produce explosives such as RDX, HMX, and CMX that used to be imported.

With the manufacture of warheads, missiles, launchers, and bombers fired from warplanes, the Turkish Mechanical and Chemical Industries Company will be the only facility in the world to bring together all these categories in one place.

6. Obstacles to Turkey’s Arms Industry

• The lack of engine technology puts Turkey under pressure as it depends mainly on imports, which are affected by many factors. For example, Turkey relies heavily on Germany for tank engines, but the latter once blocked imports due to a disagreement regarding the intervention in northern Syria. Similarly, for the Akinci drone production, Turkey relies on Ukrainian AI- 450 turboprop engines while Ukraine does not share industrialization and military technological exchange with Turkey.
• Political implications hinder Turkey from obtaining the necessary technological expertise, like the elimination of Turkey from the F- 35 fighter aircraft development program after signing the S-400 system import deal from Russia.

• Creating new markets
• Financing huge investments
• Reliance on imported and externally manufactured components whose cost increases as the local currency devalues.

To avoid these obstacles and help secure the funding for the development of Turkey’s defense industry, Turkey has partnered with Qatar to invest in military industries.

7. Development of Turkish military industries from 2015 to 2020

8. Summary

The Turkish military industry has witnessed a complete transformation, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup in 2016. The defense industry was first attached to the Turkish Presidency and then restructured into the “Presidency of Defense Industries” that has played a significant role in developing all the sectors. 

Turkey’s strategic plan emphasized the need to excel in developing defense and security technology programs and directing the manufacturing and scientific research programs to achieve independence and reduce imports from abroad.

Baykar and TIA, Turkish companies, were able to develop combat specifications and technology for drones to become more effective in winning battles on the ground while avoiding the physical and human losses of the operator. 

Moreover, the Turkish Aerospace Industry Company TAI announced that the first homemade military aircraft test flight will take place on the Republic’s centenary in 2023.

Turkish land weapons military industries (tanks, armor, and mine sweepers) have reached a high level of development with competitive prices, placing them at the forefront of Turkish military exports by $3.5 billion in 2019.

The naval military industry underwent a remarkable development as Istanbul Maritime Shipbuilding Industry and Trade Inc. managed to make the amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu and the seismic research vessel ORUÇ REİS, and several other naval military objects.

In general, Turkey’s ability to manufacture and develop homemade engines- which is in progress now- will be the future for its military industries, not to forget the need to achieve self-sufficiency.

A comprehensive development process led by the AK Party in 2002 made Turkey among the top 20 economies in the world. However, with population growth and future concerns regarding the increasing energy demand voiced by the International Energy Agency, Turkey is driven to secure and sustain its energy import resources. Here, There are two features that mark the Turkish energy markets: (1) Increased demand: According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Turkey is likely to experience the fastest medium- to long-term energy growth among IEA member states. (2) Import dependence: Turkey has begun significant market reforms, infrastructure development, and export diversification to meet this growing demand reaching approximately 70% in primary energy resources. In this study, we detail the major development of Turkey in the energy sector.

2. Turkish Energy Security Policy

Attaining energy security is the priority of Turkey as it relates to other essential sectors and contributes to the process of development.

Turkey’s energy policy focuses on increasing import sources’ diversity, maintaining investments in the energy sector, and playing an influential role in transporting gas through the Turkish territory − being an international station and route.

 In fact, Turkey is developing its policies to be an international energy hub, which provides opportunities for financial trading, price-fixing, and maintenance of storage and pipelines.

“Compared to other EU countries, Turkey’s energy security has improved on the scale of supply diversity by 15 degrees in 2019 compared to 2018,” according to the World Energy Trilemma, an annual report published by the World Energy Council.

3. National Energy Strategies and Policies before 2015

Turkey’s energy security policy was highly dependent on pipeline imports for several reasons:

1. The gas liquefaction, storage, and transportation infrastructures were not sufficient for daily consumption, as Turkey had only two liquefaction stations.
2. Imported liquefied gas was just 15% of the total imports.
3. The maximum strategic storage capacity was only 3 billion cubic meters, which was 5% of annual consumption, and it was only enough for days if supplies were compromised.

Notably, the excessive dependence on Russian gas supplies, in particular, put Turkish energy at risk as Turkey’s foreign policy towards Russia may be highly restricted.

 In 2014, the Russian natural gas exports to Turkey amounted to 26.9 billion cubic meters, representing 54.76% of total natural gas imports, followed by Iran 18.13%, Azerbaijan 12.33%, Algeria 8.48%, and Nigeria 2.8%.

 In the same year, renewable energy resources’ contribution to the overall production of energy consumption was 9.1% due to a decrease in the number of projects exploited in this sector (wind, solar, and dam hydropower). (See figure 1)

4. Map of Turkey’s Energy Resources

Due to Turkey’s sustained economic and technological development, the consumption rate increases from 3% to 8% annually, one of the world’s highest rates. Therefore, Turkey targets all the natural resources for energy production and arranges its policy for optimal use to achieve stronger energy security. (See figure 2)

5. Renewable Energy

The many renewable energy resources play a significant role in the diversification of Turkey’s energy sources and help to address some of the challenges. Through a variety of strategies, the state seeks to meet the growing need; reduce dependence on imports; enhance energy security; and secure coal, natural gas, and some nuclear investments.

6. Coal in Turkey

As stated by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Turkey has a medium reserve level of coal resources, estimated at 0.6% of the global coal reserve (18.5 billion tons).

7. Turkey’s Annual Import of Natural Gas

Moreover, a constant downward trend in natural gas consumption is noticed when comparing the first seven months of 2020 with the same period of 2019, which might be due to the Covid-19 epidemic, changes in natural gas power plant production, and climatic changes.

Turkey’s gas consumption decreased by 8.6% in 2018 and by 8 % in 2019. Home natural gas consumption was 14.4 billion cubic meters, a 14% increase compared to 2019. Additionally, during the first seven months of 2020, natural gas consumption decreased by 3.5% compared to the same period of 2019. 

Turkey’s share in the volume of liquefied natural gas imports increases every year, reaching a level of 28% in 2019 − according to data from EMRA, which is involved in energy assessments in Turkey. In the first seven months of 2020, the share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was 41% higher than the same period in 2018 and higher than the entire amount of LNG imports in 2017.

Turkey’s high import rate of liquefied gas (YGN) is due to infrastructure development:

• The storage capacity was improved to reach 5.5 billion cubic meters.
• Turkey has established four liquefied natural gas stations: Marmara Ereğlisi LNG Storage Facility, 1994 Pataş, Ege Gaz A, and 2006-Ege Gaz. 
• In 2016, Turkey built two new stations, the Etki and Liman LNG.
• In 2017, The Dörtyol floating unit for storage and conversion was set to store, process, and transport liquefied natural gas to transportation lines.
• The government is building a large facility, which will expand the storage to 20% of annual gas consumption.

On the other hand, Russia’s average share of natural gas imports to Turkey was 54% between 2010 and 2017. However, imports from Russia started to decline by the beginning of 2018, as shown in Table 4.

Remarkably, Turkey’s natural gas imports from Azerbaijan reached the highest figure with 9.6 billion cubic meters with the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) introduction.

In the first seven months of 2020, Azerbaijan’s share increased by 23%, while Russia and Iran’s share decreased compared to the same period in 2018. Actually, Russia’s import decline can be attributed to the political disagreements with Turkey and other exporters’ emergence (Algeria and Qatar). 

In 2019, Turkey exported 763 million cubic meters of natural gas to Greece and Bulgaria.

¹⁵ 15 As shown in Table 4, based on a joint agreement that specifies an approximate proportion of the quantity exported annually and ends in 2025, Turkey’s yearly import ratio of Iranian gas is close. Unlike oil, gas imports are recognized through long-term agreements internationally. 

8. Turkey’s Oil Sector

Turkey’s oil production is approximately 2.5 million tons per year, and oil reserves are 324 million barrels, located in the southeastern region— The exploration and production are handled by TPAO, a Turkish company. While oil accounts for an average of 30% of Turkey’s total energy consumption, over 90% of its needs are imported. (See Table 5)

Due to U.S. sanctions, oil imports from Iran declined in 2018 and stopped in the last six months of 2019 and the first eight months of 2020, with an increase in Russia and Iraq’s shares of imports of oil products in 2019. (See table 6)

9. Turkish Projects in the Field of Energy Security between 2015 and 2020

9.1 Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant

Having developed a plan to operate a nuclear plant since 1970, Turkey aims to add nuclear power to its energy sources as one of its economic growth objectives. As a result, Turkey has signed an agreement with Russia for the construction of 4800 MW nuclear plants. 

Turkey’s first nuclear power plant structure began in April 2018; a Franco-Japanese partnership was expected to build the second in Sinop, and China does the third and implements a uranium mining project.

Akkuyu District in Mersin has been chosen as the site for constructing the first nuclear power plant (Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant). Akkuyu is designed according to the Build-Own-Operate model and has a total capacity of 4,800 MW in four units, and the first unit is scheduled to operate by 2023. 

To maintain the nuclear energy sector, Turkey has established a new regulatory body. 

9.2 TANAP Gas Pipeline 

In 2020, Turkey and Azerbaijan opened the TANAP pipeline, which runs from Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey. The pipeline will be connected to the TAP pipeline in İpsala district of Edirne, Turkey, on the Greek border to convey natural gas to Europe.

The TANAP project will help Turkey achieve a diversity of resources and make economic gains from annual gas transit revenues through its territory, contributing to its ambition to be a regional gas trading hub.

Additionally, Azerbaijan and Turkey laid the foundation for a refinery project in Pitkim.

9.3 Natural Gas Discovery in the Black Sea

On August 21, 2020, the Turkish seismic vessel Oruç Reis detected a volume of 320 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves in the western Black Sea in the Tuna-1 zone (See map 1). Two months later, President Erdogan announced that the natural gas reserve estimates had increased by 85 billion cubic meters, a total volume of 405 billion cubic meters.

Exploration in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean continues by Oruç Reis and other drilling vessels (Fatih,  Yavuz, Kanuni).

It should be noted that the discovered natural gas is of a high quality called “dry gas” that does not contain harmful substances, and its production stages are easy, making its extraction an economically viable investment.

According to the Ministry of Energy, the production in the discovered field will begin in 2023, with an annual estimate of 10 billion cubic meters, which is likely to meet the consumption levels of 16-20% of Turkey’s natural gas needs.

Given that some Turkish gas agreements will expire in 2021, the discovered reserves may strengthen Turkey’s position in negotiating future deals. Certainly, actual and potential discoveries will have positive implications, such as improving the external trade balance, reducing foreign currency’s need, and running the foreign policy more independently.

9.4 National Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2017-2023

Under the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources’ coordination, the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (2017-2023) was developed and forced on 02/01/2018. 

Between 2017-2023, several projects— in buildings, services, energy, transport, industry, technology, and agriculture— will be implemented, and the consumption of energy resources will be reduced by 14% in Turkey in‒ 2023.

The plan that consists of 55 actions is expected to provide 23.9 million tons of energy resources in cumulative terms and invest $10.9 billion in the energy sector by 2023. Accordingly, the financial abundance is calculated at $8.4 billion in 2017-2023.

9.5 2023 Strategy

Through the Ministry of Energy, the Turkish Government has put forward a strategic plan of action that includes the following:

• Increasing the proportion of hybrid electricity, based on local and renewable energy sources, from 59% to 65% of total energy
• Including nuclear power in supply sources and continuing efforts to increase its share
• Strengthening natural gas and electricity infrastructure
• Ensuring the acceleration of oil and natural gas exploration and production activities, especially at the seas
• Planning of the power system for electric vehicles
• Continuing efforts to make Turkey an energy trade hub
• Technology development and settlement in energy and natural resources
• Continuing efforts to increase the rate of domestic production of energy and natural resource equipment
• Increasing research and development projects of strategic importance in the field of energy and natural resources

Turkey has made significant expansions into natural gas infrastructure. It has two underground storage facilities, Silivri and Tuz Göl, with a total capacity of 5.4 billion cubic meters. Turkey continues to make investments to expand underground storage capacity, aiming to increase it to store at least 20% of its annual consumption.

In 2018, two stations were built to convert imported gas into usable gas. And, with the expansion of the two liquefied natural gas stations, the total injection capacity reached 117 million cubic meters per day. Although the transport capacity of natural gas networks reached over 300 million cubic meters per day, Turkey aims to reach 400 million cubic meters per day with future expansions.

10. Turkey’s Energy Security Challenges

– Turkey faces fundamental challenges in energy security by relying almost completely on importing oil and gas from other countries, which may restrict its foreign policy. Indeed, when Turkey shot down the Russian aircraft, Russians could have cut off gas supplies that accounted for 53% of Turkey’s gas imports and 19% of oil imports.

– At the time of writing, Turkey still faces an increasing challenge to discover gas and oil resources to enhance its energy security.

– Attracting investments in renewable energies— whose financing, operation, and maintenance costs are high— is also an ongoing challenge to enhance Turkey’s energy security. 

– Turkey has recently moved to build a number of nuclear plants to fill part of the need for electrical power. Those plants are inexpensive (compared to renewable energies) but present an environmental hazard in case of error.

11. Objective Comparison of Turkey’s Energy Security between 2015 and 2020

12. Conclusion

Before 2015, Turkey faced major energy security challenges, as it relied on a few sources to secure its imports; the infrastructure was ill-equipped, and the strategic reserve ratio was limited. However, Turkey has developed specific strategies after 2015. The State has achieved advanced infrastructure projects, such as constructing a strategic reserve of 20% of annual gas consumption. It has also begun building nuclear power plants and opened two gas pipelines from Russia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Turkey has increased research and exploration in its territorial waters in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean and has developed the infrastructure for generating electricity through renewable energies (solar, wind, hydro).The State was able to achieve considerable diversification in importing energy resources after relying on few. Indeed, these projects aim to achieve the State’s energy security and establish Turkey as a regional and international gas distribution center that controls the gas taps, thus enhancing its geopolitical and economic status. Stemming from the State’s vision for integrated development, these strategies have played the most prominent role in raising Turkey’s energy security.

The Relations between 1948 and 2000:

Before the declaration of independence of Israel, in 1947, Turkey objected to the United Nations partition plan for Palestine however during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey opted to stay neutral, and they did prevent Turkish citizens from being a participant in the war. Afterwards, the Israeli state was born in 1948 in Palestine; as an outcome of the ideology of Zionism, the new state has identified itself as “a homeland for Jewish people”. Basically, Zionism is a political movement that aims to return the Jewish people to their homeland with freedom, independence, statehood, and security. The Turkish state has been the first Muslim state who recognized the newborn Israeli state. Although Turkey’s recognition of the Israeli state was relatively quick, its relations were not that close in the first years. Although there were several reasons behind that, two of those were primary reasons. Firstly, the Arabs’ stance toward the Israeli state was not allowing Turkey to act freely. Turkish foreign policy did not change until Arabs became more moderate towards Israel. As a second reason, Turkey’s suspicion of Israeli support for the Soviet Union was a factor for Turkey’s distance from Israel since the Turkish state’s foreign policy orientation was Westward during these years.  The effect of the development of American-Israeli relations in the future periods was seen in Turkey-Israel relations.

At the beginning of the 1950s, there were attempts to promote relations. To illustrate that, Adnan Menderes, the prime minister of Turkey, made a call to Arab states to recognize the Israeli state. Bilateral relations improved considerably in the second half of the 1950s. In order to reduce the rising Arab nationalism and Soviet influence, a secret agreement, which envisaged the sharing of intelligence, and trade agreement was made between the two countries. However, Turkey went far away from the USA’s Middle East policy and reformed its position towards Palestinians after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and this  became one of the main turning points of the dual relations. Followingly, Turkey showed a stand against Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israel war by wanting the US not to use its military bases in support of Israel. Another development that has directed Turkey to have closer relations with Arabs was the oil crisis of 1973. During these years, Turkey took a side with the Palestinians and even recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1975. In the same year Turkey voted in the favour of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 which determined that Zionism is a form of racism. Israeli Knesset adopted the Jerusalem Law in July 1980 hence Turkey reduced its diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of junior chargés d’affaires in November 1980. While it was expected that relations would get warmer in 1986 with the appointment of a senior diplomat with ambassadorial rank, with the start of the intifada in 1987, Turkey took the side of Palestinians and relations between Israel and Turkey stagnated. In that time period, the effects of the Cold War were also visible in the relations of these two countries. Since, Turkey tried to establish its foreign policy according to the bipolar structure during the Cold War period.

During the 1990s, the relationship between Israel and Turkey rapidly deepened by taking advantage of the post-Cold War environment and regional developments, including the Madrid Peace Conference, the First Gulf War and the Oslo Process. These are some important developments in that era: in 1991, diplomatic relations were upgraded with both PLO and Israel. The year 1994 was important in terms of being the starting point of military cooperation with the Israeli state. In the same year, Prime Minister of Turkey, Tansu Çiller, visited Israel. She had signed some agreements during her travel. From 1996 to 1998, Turkey and Israel further consolidated their strategic partnership by signing significant bilateral agreements in different fields such as economy, trade, technology, and science. Additionally, Turkey opened up its airspace to Israeli fighter pilots for training exercises and started to receive hundreds of thousands of Israeli tourists each year, averaging around 235,000 Israelis per year between 1996 and 2000.

The Period between 2000 and 2009:

In the early 2000s, there were incidents that caused an increase in negative views in Turkish public opinion about the USA and its ally Israel. Following Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the second intifada started in late 2000. Two years later, in April 2002, the Israel Defense Forces entered the Jenin refugee camp and killed many Palestinians. The Jenin massacre is one of the causes of this negative opinion, especially when the USA president called Ariel Sharon, the head of the massacre, as “a man of peace”, provoked people. In addition to negative public opinion, Turkish politicians made negative statements about Israel. Ecevit had declared that Israel commits genocide against Palestinians, and Arınç, one of the top officials of JDP, had emphasized a resemblance with Hitler and Sharon. When the JDP came to power, it continued to make similar statements about the Israeli state. In addition to the massacres in Palestine, other factors arose that increased the anger of the Turkish people towards the state of Israel. The Iraq War of 2003, the assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in 2004 were crucial events among those. The Prime Minister of Turkey had made a statement about the assassination of Ahmed Yassin, evaluated it as “intolerable” and he emphasized the Turkish mass’s feelings by saying that “this wounds my people and me deeply”. Despite all these, Turkey maintained its security relations with Israel. The Israeli Defense Minister had interpreted Turkey’s stance on Israeli policies as a result of the Turkish public’s criticism of Israel. Moreover, he did not evaluate the Turkish state’s manner as an ultimate obstacle for defence and commercial ties between these two countries.

Both Netanyahu and Erdogan did not hesitate to act pragmatically in bilateral relations. Because bilateral relations helped both countries to achieve gains in different fields. In addition to that, JDP differed from the former Turkish governments, which was that it had been a volunteer to take a role as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkey’s effort has led Turkey to have some expectations from the state of Israel. As a crucial step, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Israel in 2005. Turkey has been disappointed when Israel attacked Gaza in 2008 because the Israeli state did not keep its promise that they would follow a peaceful path.

The Relations between 2009 and 2018

Turkish dissatisfaction with Israeli policies had achieved its peak in the World Economic Forum meetings in Davos. Hence, Davos had been a turning point in Turkish-Israeli relations. Erdoğan had made a statement accusing the Israeli state of knowing very well how to kill, and he left the meeting. This was followed by the tension created by a Turkish TV series that allegedly damaged Israel’s image, and a diplomatic crisis caused by placing the Turkish ambassador in a lower-level sofa.

 However, the real crisis had occurred when there had been an attack against the Turkish ship in international waters by Israeli forces. Turkish civilians were injured, and even 10  people lost their lives. This event had created enormous criticism in the Turkish mass, and officials reacted to that attack. Erdoğan’s statements clearly showed his anger, and he evaluated this attack as another indicator of how Israelis are good at killing people. Israeli officials had referred to killed people on the flotilla as “terrorists”. On the other hand, the Turkish public was sharing the sadness of martyrs. 

The crises between these two states had followed each other, there was tension between them. Although they had a diplomatic freeze between 2010 and 2016, bilateral trade between them had increased contemporaneously. In 2011, just one year after the flotilla attack, the economy of these two countries had overgrown. This shows that Israel and Turkey successfully separated their economy and politics from each other such that trade has expanded 26% in 2011 compared to 2010. Besides that, Turkey has reiterated its demand on Israel to lift the blockade in Gaza Strip. Although the citizens did not always share the same mentality with their leaders, the economy and politics were kept separated by the leaders. 

Turkish planes have been sent to Northern Israel to help stop forest fires in 2010 and Israel had offered help for the earthquake in Eastern Turkey in 2011. The USA had played an essential role during this normalization process between Israel and Turkey. Turkey had three conditions to accept normalization with Israel: a formal apology about the attack, financial compensation for victims, and ending the siege on the Gaza Strip. The last one of them had become a topic of long discussions.

Finally, in 2013, Netanyahu apologized to Turkey about the flotilla attack. In other words, Israel had realized the first demand of Turkey, paid compensation to families, and also eased the siege of Gaza. Although it was thought that the apology of Netanyahu would be highly effective in the normalization of relations, it did not come true. The fact that normalization was linked to local and regional conditions explained that the situation was more complex than an apology. Moreover, as a country that supports the rise of Islam in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, Turkey considered being close to Israel as embarrassing.

 In 2016, a reconciliation agreement was announced by Israel and Turkey. The process has had a beneficial effect on the economic relations between these countries importantly, and trade has been on the rise. Relations have improved during the year in many fields such as tourism, the Minister of Tourism of Turkey visited Israel in 2017. In addition to that, in the same year, a delegation from the Turkish Energy Ministry visited Israel to have a comprehensive discussion about the possibility of a gas pipeline to Europe via Turkey. Shortly, there were essential cooperation agreements and attempts in a variety of fields between Israel and Turkey.

Nevertheless, the image in the media between these two countries was contradicting the facts and numbers related to their economic relations. Both parties’ statements about each other include hostility and humiliation. While Erdoğan was blaming Israel as a “terror state” and Netanyahu as a “terrorist”. Netanyahu responded to Erdoğan as “I am not used to receiving lectures about morality from a leader who bombs Kurdish villagers in his native Turkey, who jails journalists, who helps Iran get around international sanctions.” Apart from the mutual bickering of the leaders, successful economic relations not only continued, but the ties were also strengthened. To examine the reasons behind these antipodal  relations, one can look at the political parties of both states that were in power during the years of economic expansion. Israel’s Likud and Turkey’s AKP have liberal values in their approach to the economy, that is, both attach great importance to the economy. So much so that the AKP adopts an ideology-free approach in its economic policies, and Erdoğan himself uses the phrase “money has no nationality” on this issue.

The dual relations had been affected negatively during the Great March of Return since Israel has used power on Palestinians who have attended that march. Turkish Ambassador to Tel Aviv was called to the centre for consultations by the Turkish Ministry on 15 May 2018. Turkey-Israel relations are conducted by the temporary charge d’affaires in the embassy since the date in question.

Current Developments in the Relations:

Turkey and Israel are countries that have benefits out of the dual relationships. These two countries, located in the same region, have common aspects on different issues such as seeing Assad and the growth of Shiite militia as national threats. There are cooperations between them in many fields such as energy, security and trade. Their intelligence agencies did not stop working together despite dense political crises that occurred in the dual relationships. On the other hand, the main topic that causes differentiation and problems between these two countries is the Palestinian reality. Erdoğan mentioned that as follows: “the obstacle was Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians”. 

Although Turkey is a vital component of Israeli national security by becoming a NATO ally and having one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East, it is no longer the only choice of Israel in the region. Since Israel has strengthened its position in the area by new agreements such as Abraham Accords in 2020. The Israeli side expected Turkey to downplay the identity-based political perspective and to make some changes in its policy towards Israel and the Palestinian issue for a possible reconciliation. Israel demanded from Ankara to stop its support for Hamas for a rapprochement. “In August 2020, Israel objected to Turkey giving passports to members of Hamas in Istanbul, which it described as ’a very unfriendly step’. In January 2021, Israel declared that relations could not be improved unless Turkey expels members of Hamas now living in the country and using it as a base for directing terrorist activities in Gaza and the West Bank, and transferring funds to Hamas.”After the change of leadership in the USA, a very important development occurred in relations: Netanyahu, who had been the Prime Minister for the last 12 years, was unable to form a coalition. After the election repeated for the 4th time within two years, the new Israeli government was formed by 8 parties, received a vote of confidence on 13 June 2021 and took the oath. Thus, one of the long-standing actors in Israeli-Turkish relations has changed. In terms of bilateral relations, the well-known Netanyahu-Erdogan conflict came to an end. Additionally, a presidential change took place in Israel. Erdoğan and the new President Herzog had a telephone conversation, the highest level meeting between two countries in many years. Erdoğan celebrated Herzog on his inauguration, and the phone call continued for about forty minutes. In the phone conversation, the importance of bilateral relations, great cooperation potentials in many field especially in energy, tourism and technology were mentioned. This conversation between leaders who agreed on the continuation of communication and dialogue, can be regarded as a landmark of positive developments in the relationship in the coming days.

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Power in international relations is “the ability of one actor to change the behavior of another actor.” Hard power, which is one of the types of power, means the military and economic power that an actor uses to change the behavior of other actors. Hard power is based on encouragement (“carrot”) or threat (“stick”). The second type of power, soft power, can be defined as the “attractiveness” aroused by a country’s political values, culture and foreign policy principles, to the extent that it is seen as legitimate. Soft power is based on the ability to shape the behavior of other actors. While sources of soft power consist of institutions, values, culture and policies, the tools of soft power are “agenda setting”, “attraction” and “Co-opt”. 

Soft power basically consists of three elements: culture, political values and foreign policy. The more universal a country’s culture is, the more it will be a center of attraction. A government champions the values, such as democracy, working with international institutions, and promoting peace and human rights. That influences the preferences of others. States’ use of soft power resources is slower and more common than hard power. In cases where soft power is successful, the gain is more permanent.

This study will deal with the increase of Turkey’s soft power, which is an important regional power in the Middle East, through the Iraq case. Ranking 27th in the Global Soft Power Index published by Brand Finance every year, Turkey started to attach importance to soft power in its foreign policy after the Cold War. While Turkey spreads the Turkish language and culture through its official institutions, it spreads its popular culture through Turkish TV series. Turkey’s second source of soft power is its cooperation with economic development and emergency humanitarian aid.

2. Elements of Turkey’s Soft Power

While democracy is among the soft power elements of Turkey in terms of domestic policy, it also defends the supremacy of international law in terms of foreign policy. Other elements include its history and culture. According to Nye, the attraction a state’s culture evokes when it serves the values and interests shared by others will help it achieve the desired results. In this sense, the fact that Turkey is based on 16 Turkish Empires reminds that it has an important cultural and historical background. Another soft power source of Turkey is its institutions operating in the outside world. Until the post-Cold War period, Turkey did not have soft power due to the institution with which it would establish external connections, apart from Anadolu Agency and TRT. However, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TCCA), established in 1992, provides development assistance in Turkish-speaking Turkic republics and operates in economic, cultural, educational, social, technical and commercial areas. In addition to the TCCA, NGOs and Yunus Emre Institute, respectively, contribute to Turkey’s soft power due to the aid they provide and the projects they carry out to spread Turkish culture and language abroad. The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), and the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) are Turkey’s soft power institutions. 

Turkey pursues two different soft power strategies. First, activities that can contribute to the publicity of Turkey’s culture and language, such as public diplomacy and student exchange programs, mean the use of culture as a foreign policy tool. Turkish TV series are exported to the outside world in order to spread Turkish culture. In this sense, Turkey became the country that exports the most TV series in the world after the USA in 2019. The series met with more than 700 million viewers in 146 countries. The appearance of Turkey as a modern and rich country in TV series makes Turkey a cultural center of attraction. In this sense, there has been an increase in the number of tourists coming to Turkey from the countries where Turkish TV series are watched the most. While the number of tourists coming to Turkey from Middle Eastern countries was 975 thousand in 2002, this figure exceeded 3.6 million in 2010. For example, the number of tourists coming to Turkey from the United Arab Emirates, where the “Gümüş” TV series is watched the most, increased by 21 percent. Turkey’s second soft power strategy is cooperation with economic development and humanitarian aid. For example, Turkey became the second country in the world in 2020 to provide the most humanitarian aid with 8 million dollars.

3. Turkey’s Soft Power in Iraq

The use of culture as a foreign policy tool in Turkey’s Iraqi foreign policy: 1) Official institutions such as the YTB, Yunus Emre Institute and the TMF; 2) NGOs; 3) Popular culture, especially TV series. By coordinating the activities for citizens, kin, and relatives communities of the Republic of Turkey abroad and international scholarship students studying in Turkey, the YTB contributes to Turkey’s becoming a new base in higher education. In the “Turkey Scholarships” program initiated by the YTB in 2012, 33 thousand students from 165 countries have been given scholarships to date. A record number of applications are received every year. 165,000 international students from 178 countries applied to the program, which has a quota of 3,500 scholars every year. 25% of these are applied from the Middle East. 978 international students, thus, were accepted from the Middle East for the 2020 school year. Consequently, the scholarship students who graduated from Turkey regularly attend alumni meetings when they return to their countries, which is functional in promoting and disseminating Turkey’s culture. As such, the “Iraq Promotion and Culture Day” event is also held in Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi Turkey Graduates Association, founded by Iraqi graduates, carries out activities such as helping those in need in Iraq. The effect of the “Turkey Scholarships” program on Turkey’s soft power in Iraq, which functions as a bridge in the promotion of Turkey’s cultural relations with other countries, can be seen with the duties that alumni students take in the countries they return to. For instance, Iraqi academic Cuma Muhammed, who received his master’s degree in the Department of Turkish Language and Literature at Selcuk University in Turkey, became the founder of the Department of Turkish Language and Literature at Zakho University in Iraq’s Duhok province.

Contributing to the spread of Turkish language and culture around the world, Yunus Emre Institute has activated 60 Turkish Cultural Centers in 50 countries around the world. In 2017, it launched the online Turkish Teaching Portal. In 3 years, 394 thousand people from 196 different countries of the world have been enrolled to the portal to learn Turkish. An average of 180 new members are registered daily to the Turkish Teaching Portal, which is free of charge. Nearly half of these students are in the 0-20 age range, which is important for the qualified workforce who speaks Turkish to come to Turkey. In addition, the spread of Turkish is an issue that increases Turkey’s soft power. Finally, Iraq is among the 10 countries with the highest number of users in the Turkish Teaching Portal. Although there is no Yunus Emre Cultural Center in Iraq, it receives lecturers to work in the departments of Turkish Language and Literature within universities it cooperates with within the framework of the Turkology (Türkoloji) project. In this vein, 101 Turkology Departments were opened in universities from all over the world. For example, Salahaddin, Kirkuk and Mosul University from Iraq are within the scope of this project. 

The TMF is Turkey’s opendoor to the world in international education. Established with Law No. 6721 dated June 17, 2016, the TMF carries out all educational activities abroad on behalf of Turkey, from pre-school to higher education, from formal education to non-formal education. In this sense, it establishes facilities such as non-formal education courses, study centers and cultural centers, as well as libraries, laboratories, art and sports facilities. The TMF operates in 67 countries with 360 educational institutions. Operating in Iraq since 2018, the TMF has 14 educational institutions in Iraq. 2,000 Iraqi students receive education in these institutions. A cooperation was made between the TMF and the Iraqi Ministry of Education to improve the qualifications of 87 teachers working in the cities where Turkmens live, especially Kirkuk, in Iraq. Apart from Turkmen, Arab and Kurdish students also are enrolled in TMF educational institutions in Iraq. The number of students taught in Turkish in Iraq reached 300. 

Turkey’s second soft power strategy, cooperation with economic development and humanitarian aid, contributes to Turkey’s attractiveness abroad. One of the most influential institutions in this field, the TCCA operates in all developing countries, especially in the Turkish-speaking countries, in order to “protect the common historical, cultural and social heritage and values abroad, and to eliminate prejudices between societies”. The TCCA, which has 62 Program Coordination Offices in 60 countries on 5 continents, has carried out more than 30 thousand projects. These projects aim to increase Turkey’s international image. The Middle East is one of TCCA’s important areas of interest. In addition to Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen and Jordan in the Middle East, there is the TCCA Program Coordination Office in Iraq. The Middle East and Africa region ranks first with a share of 23.79 percent in TCCA’s 2020 total expenditures. In this context, it is seen that the TCCA supports the regions in Iraq where Turkmen live intensely. When we examine TCCA’s activities between 2018 and 2019, the TCCA renovated the institutions in Iraq that were damaged due to terrorist activities and conflicts. In this context, it carried out the restoration of a high school and the faculty building of Tal Afar University in the Taji region of Baghdad. In addition, while establishing a clinic for the Cancer Hospital in Mosul, which became unusable, it provided 20 transformers for use in Talafar. In addition, the TCCA restorated for the Baghdad Azamiye Kulliye (Imam-ı Azam Ebu Hanife), which was given importance in the Seljuk and Ottoman periods. Also, it restored the Abdulkadir Geylani Tomb, which was restored several times during the Ottoman period in Iraq. The TCCA restored the Kirkuk Kayseri Bazaar in Kirkuk, Iraq, which was an Ottoman work built in 1855 and burned in 2019 and carried out road construction together with Tuzhurmatu municipality in Tuzhurmatu district in Iraq. In addition, the TCCA carried out the “Baghdad FM Radio Station Establishment Project” for the establishment of a radio channel for Turkmens in Baghdad. In addition to restoration, transportation and communication infrastructures, the TCCA provided food aid to Turkmen families in need in Iraq in 2019 within the scope of emergency aid. 

As can be seen in Graph 2, Turkey is the 6th country in the world that provides the most development aid. As a developing country, Turkey maintains its leadership. As can be seen in Graph 3, Turkey’s official development assistance has been rising, especially since 2016. 7.5 million dollars of the total official development aid in 2019 includes emergency and humanitarian aid. Almost all of Turkey’s official development aid ($7.6 million) goes to the Middle East region. Among the countries that benefited most from Turkey’s bilateral official development assistance, including all types of aid, Syria ranked first with 7.2 million dollars in aid, Bosnia and Herzegovina came in second with 59 million dollars, while Iraq was the third largest recipient of aid from Turkey with 42 million dollars. Apart from Turkey’s official development aid, NGOs that come to the fore with their humanitarian aid activities abroad also contribute to Turkey’s soft power. In particular, NGOs operating in conflict zones contribute to the formation of a positive perception towards Turkey among the people of the region. In this field, NGOs such as the Turkish Red Crescent, Turkish Religious Foundation, IHH, Cansuyu, and Doctors Earth come to the fore. While NGO aid from Turkey was 826 thousand dollars in 2018, it became 349 thousand dollars in 2019.

4. Conclusion

The concept of soft power, which was developed by Joseph Nye in 2004, has recently gotten the states’ attention. States that have hard power elements, which are based on traditional forces, strive to acquire and increase soft power elements in order to realize their interests in world politics. To the extent that a country’s political values, culture and foreign policy principles are seen as legitimate, soft power elements, defined as “attractiveness” aroused by other countries, are agenda setting, attraction and attraction. While states are setting the agenda through their institutions, they seek to co-opt and attract other states through values, culture and policies. In this sense, dealing with how Turkey’s values, culture, politics and institutions as soft power elements contribute to Turkey’s soft power, the study analyzes Turkey’s soft power in Iraq. Turkey pursues two soft power strategies. The first finding of the analysis is functionalition of culture as a tool in Turkey’s foreign policy. In this respect, institutions such as the YTB, Turkish Maarif Foundation and Yunus Emre Institute contribute to the culture, language and promotion of Turkey. The Middle East has an important place in the budgets of institutions. In the use of culture as a foreign policy tool, Turkey’s export of TV series interacts with its soft power in terms of the increase in tourists coming to Turkey. Turkey’s second soft power strategy is to cooperate on development projects via institutions such as the TCCA and provide humanitarian aid through NGOs. The ranking of Turkey in the second donor country in the world, especially in terms of humanitarian aid, strengthens its image worldwide. Furthermore, it has been observed that Turkey’s efforts to spread the Turkish language and culture as well as its development projects and humanitarian aid are carried out in regions where Turkmen live intensely. As Nye stated, Turkey’s soft power in Iraq would be permanent in the context of soft power strategies, if it proceeds in the long run.